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The most important rule of all is the last sentence of
[FRCP] 1, which provides that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ‘shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.’ It is this
command that gives all the other rules life and meaning and
timbre in the realist world of the trial court.1
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] The primary purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) is “to economize time and expense in trying … suits.”2 That
* Mia Mazza is a partner, Emmalena K. Quesada is an associate, and Ashley L. Sternberg
is a former associate, all in the San Francisco office of Morrison & Foerster, LLP. They
gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Geoffrey Graber, Eric Brooks, Elizabeth J.
Miles, Michael Sachdev, and Christopher Jeu to this article. Mia also acknowledges her
law partner Steven M. Kaufmann for his early teachings on the importance of FRCP 1.
1
In re Paris Air Crash, 69 F.R.D. 310, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
2
Warnick v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D. Md. 1946).
See also Des Isles v. Evans, 225 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1955) (stating that the primary
purpose of the rules is to secure “speedy and inexpensive justice in a uniform and well
ordered manner.”); Marin v. Knopf, 1 F.R.D. 436, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (“The real
purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . is to eliminate technicalities, delays
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mandate is articulated in FRCP 1, which requires that the FRCP “be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.”3 In reality, few parties to litigation in
federal court receive the prompt and economical resolution that FRCP 1
seems to promise. Nowhere is this more evident than in cases involving
the discovery of large volumes of electronically stored information.4
[2] Discovery of electronic information is now an everyday fact of
litigation in the U.S. Advances in computer software and hardware (e.g.,
e-mail, instant messaging, voicemail, blogs, laptops, .pdfs, PDAs, zip or
flash drives, databases, and network servers) have greatly increased the
ability to generate, replicate, circulate, and accumulate electronic
information. At the same time, however, those technological advances
also have resulted in the exponential growth of electronically stored
information (“ESI”) that may be relevant to, and is now routinely
requested in, litigation. It is estimated that more than 90% of all
information today is created and retained in an electronic format.5

and expense and secure prompt and effective adjudication on the merits when a cause of
action is set forth.”); Boysell Co. v. Colonial Coverlet Co. 29 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E. D.
Tenn. 1939) (“[T]he intention of the new rules is to expedite litigation, to save cost and
principally and primarily to reach justice by obtaining a full disclosure of the truth in
connection with any controversy.”).
3
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Throughout this article, references to “FRCP,” “Rules,” or “Rule” are
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. References to “Amendments,” “Amendment,”
or “Amended” are to the FRCP amendments that were effective December 1, 2006.
4
The authors are of the opinion that the ubiquitous term “e-discovery” will eventually, if
not soon, become outdated. The discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”) is
fast becoming the norm, with companies often converting paper records into electronic
format for storage, at times complete with semi-searchable text created through Optical
Character Recognition (“OCR”) or other technology. Accordingly, in time, the term “ediscovery” should be retired so that litigants can go back to using the term “discovery.”
5
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds.,
2005), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/RetGuide200409.pdf [hereinafter
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES]; see also, e.g. Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002
WL 264004, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2002) (“E-mails have replaced other forms of
communication besides just paper-based communication. Many informal messages that
were previously relayed by telephone or at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail”).
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[3] Unfortunately for litigants, “the advantages of computerization in the
business world—the reduction of costs and greater efficiency in recording,
storing, manipulating and retrieving information—have not translated into
advantages in discovery.” 6 The explosive growth of ESI has changed the
very nature of discovery, with new electronic complexities making the
preservation and production of evidence far more challenging.7 It is an
accepted fact that “the discovery of computer-based information [can] cost
more, take more time and create more headaches than conventional, paper
based discovery.”8
[4] There are several characteristics of ESI that can make its discovery
particularly expensive and burdensome:
•
•

It is dynamic, and thus it can be altered or destroyed by the
ordinary operation of a computer, often without the operator’s
knowledge or direction.
It is persistent, and thus it can continue to exist despite apparent
“deletion”—yet in a state that makes it difficult to locate, retrieve,
or search.

6

Kenneth J. Withers, The Real Cost of Virtual Discovery, 7 FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEWS,
Feb. 12, 2001, at 3.
7
See Kemper Mortgage, Inc. v. Russell, No. 3:06-cv-042, 2006 WL 2319858, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio April 18, 2006) (“Computers have become a standard tool of doing business, with
many associated benefits and costs. One of the benefits but also burdens is that it is
easier to preserve a great deal of information than it was with paper systems. One of the
unexpected costs of using the electronic tool is that it may become costly to abide by
one’s duty to preserve evidence.”); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, 229 F.R.D. 568, 572
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (“As contrasted with traditional paper discovery, e-discovery has the
potential to be vastly more expensive due to the sheer volume of electronic information
that can be easily and inexpensively stored on backup media . . . . Depending on how the
electronic data is stored, it can be difficult, and hence expensive, to retrieve the data and
search it for relevant documents.”) (citations omitted).
8
Withers, supra note 6, at 3. See, e.g., Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson,
229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (“[T]he cost of restoring, de-duplicating, and
designing and conducting a search of all 996 backup tapes reasonably could be in the
range of several million [dollars] . . . [not including] the costs of privilege review and
actual production.”).
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It is dependent upon the technology that created it, and thus it can
be incomprehensible when separated from that system.9
It is used and retained in a variety of different forms and in a
multiplicity of locations (including servers, backup tapes, desktops,
laptops, PDAs, home computers, and so forth), many of which are
hard to reach.

[5] Finally, the volume of ESI is staggering in comparison with
conventional paper discovery. It is not infrequent for a terabyte (i.e.,
1,000 gigabytes, 1 million megabytes, or 500 billion typewritten pages) of
ESI to be at issue in large civil litigation or in government investigations.10
The sheer magnitude and diversity of ESI that must be dealt with creates
significant difficulties and costs for lawyers and litigants.
[6] For example, the cost of responding to a discovery request can be in
the millions of dollars if several years’ worth of archived e-mails and files
must be located, preserved, restored, sorted through, and collected in a
forensically sound manner.11 While companies retain vast amounts of
ESI, much of it is stored for disaster-recovery purposes.12 Therefore,
“[r]etrieving computer based records or data is not the equivalent of
getting the file from a file cabinet or archives.”13 The cost of restoring
certain types of electronic information to a readable, searchable, and
reviewable form can be astronomical, particularly in light of the limited
amount of relevant information that the exercise may ultimately yield.
Finally, there is the time and cost to cull, de-duplicate, review, and cleanse
the data to exclude or redact non-relevant or confidential material before
production. Assuming it takes a skilled attorney using available
technology an average rate of one hour to review 100 documents, it would
9

COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 23 (Sept. 2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf
10
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4TH) § 11.446 (2004).
11
Linda Volonino, Electronic Evidence and Computer Forensics, 12 COMM. ASS’N FOR
INFO. SYS. 463 (2003), available at http://cais.isworld.org/articles/12-27/article.pdf.
12
See, e.g., Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01 2004 WL 1949062,
at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“electronic records [often] are not stored for the purposes of
being able to retrieve an individual document” but rather “for emergency uploading into a
computer system to permit recovery from catastrophic computer failure”).
13
Id.
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take him or her 5 years to review 1 million documents working 2,000
hours per year.
[7] At every stage of discovery, decisions must be made about where to
devote money and resources. Deep in the trenches of discovery and facing
the task of collecting, reviewing, and producing millions of electronic
documents, it is easy for attorneys to lose sight of the forest for the
terabytes. With the mounting volumes of ESI being created and stored,
the practical reality is that discovery must become “not just about
uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can
afford to disinter.”14 Parties, lawyers, and judges have an opportunity
today to begin taking creative new approaches to the discovery of ESI,
with a renewed focus on the important (yet often neglected) mandate of
FRCP 1.
[8] This article discusses the directive of FRCP 1 (Section II) and
articulates several practical approaches to cutting (Section III) and shifting
(Section IV) the costs of the discovery of electronically stored
information. The authors posit that the approaches discussed herein are
consistent with the command and spirit of FRCP 1, under which the
“[c]ost of discovery is a pertinent and appropriate consideration.”15
II. FRCP 1: THE PROMISE OF A JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE
DETERMINATION OF EVERY ACTION

[9] FRCP 1 is “one of the least frequently cited, but most important”16 of
all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17 It commands that the Rules “be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
14

Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
15
Butterworth v. Indus. Chem., Inc., 145 F.R.D. 585, 589 (N.D. Fla. 1991).
16
United States v. Texas, 523 F. Supp. 703, 723 (E.D. Tex. 1981); see also N. River Ins.
Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (calling
FRCP 1 “important but often neglected”).
17
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were originally adopted in 1938 by the Supreme
Court. It was the result of the work of an Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme
Court in 1935 pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2071-74 (2006)).
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determination of every action.”18 Those three aims are “a basic tenet of
modern dispute resolution, an article of faith in Anglo-American civil
They are “complementary” attributes that must be
procedure.”19
considered in every case.20
[10] The Supreme Court has observed that FRCP 1 reflects a “national
policy . . . to minimize the costs of litigation.”21 The goal of reducing
litigation costs is underscored by the 1993 amendment to FRCP 1, which
clarifies that the Rules must be “administered,” as well as “construed,” to
secure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”22
The Advisory Committee stated that “[t]he purpose of this revision . . . is
to recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise the authority
conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only
fairly, but also without undue cost or delay.”23
[11] The 1993 amendments to the FRCP were part of an ongoing effort
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to reduce the costs of litigation. For
example, at the time the Advisory Committee was working on the 1993
amendments, Congress also was passing the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 (CJRA).24 The CJRA was “rooted in more than a decade of concern

18

FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Liberian Oceanway Corp., 398 F.
Supp. 104, 110 (D.P.R. 1975) (stating that courts are obligated “to construe the
procedures in such a manner as to secure the fast, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action.”); Kenney v. Cal. Tanker Co., 381 F.2d 775, 777 (3rd Cir. 1967)
(“[Courts] have the responsibility to secure the just and speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action”); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F. Supp. 825, 827 (E.D.
Mich. 1944) (“It is the duty of the courts to construe the Rules of Civil Procedure so as to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”).
19
Patrick Johnston, Problems In Raising Prayers to Level of Rule: The Example of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1326-27 (1995).
20
Boe v. Lane & Co., 428 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (E.D. La. 1977).
21
Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 234 (1964).
22
FED. R. CIV. P 1 (emphasis added); FED R. CIV. P. 1, comm. n (1993). For a thorough
discussion of the legislative history behind the 1993 Amendment to Rule 1, see Johnston,
supra note 19, at 1325.
23
FED R. CIV. P. 1, comm. n (1993).
24
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 101-105, 104 Stat. 5089-98
(1990).
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that cases in federal courts take too long and cost litigants too much.”25
Under the CJRA, federal courts are required to implement a “civil justice
expense and delay reduction plan” to ensure a just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of civil disputes.26
[12] To achieve the outcome that FRCP 1 contemplates, the FRCP must
be construed “liberally.”27 Nowhere is this more true than when the
federal courts apply Rules governing discovery. FRCP 1 has been cited in
denying discovery that “would properly be characterized as a fishing
expedition, causing needless expense and burden to all concerned.”28
Courts also have held that the sharing of information obtained in discovery
with litigants in comparable cases is consistent with FRCP 1, as it
eliminates the time and expense of rediscovery.29 The directive of FRCP
1 is thus clear: “[t]he provisions governing discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are more than mere procedural guidelines to be
consulted at the pleasure of a party to a federal suit. The language of these
rules is carefully drafted and specific in its terms in order that they ‘secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”30
[13] According to the Advisory Committee, the 1993 amendment to FRCP
1 proclaimed the “central theme and purpose” of several contemporaneous
Rule amendments, including “reducing excessive delays and expense in
civil litigation; curtailing and eliminating frivolous claims and defenses;
reducing burdens on litigants; and preserving scarce judicial resources.”31
25

James Kakalik, et al., Just, Speedy and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case
Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, INST. FOR CIVIL JUST. 1 (1996).
26
28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994).
27
Plant Econ., Inc. v. Mirror Insulation Co., 308 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1962).
28
N. River Ins. Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F Supp 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
29
See, e.g., Baker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123, 126 (D. Mass 1990) (holding
that sharing discovery is consistent with FRCP 1 and particularly appropriate in tobacco
tort cases in which individual plaintiffs must litigate against large, corporate defendants);
Wauchop v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 539, 546 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (explaining that
the sharing of discovery materials furthers the goals of FRCP 1 by eliminating time and
expense involved in discovery).
30
Philpot v. Philco-Ford Corp., 63 F.R.D. 672, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (citation and internal
quoted omitted).
31
Johnston, supra note 19, at 1328.
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III. PUTTING TECHNOLOGY TO WORK FOR YOU: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES
FOR CUTTING THE COSTS OF ESI DISCOVERY
[14] Even the 1993 Advisory Committee could not have imagined how
prescient and relevant was its emphasis on cost-efficiency, or how farreaching the scope of its mandate, in view of the explosion of electronic
data that was about to happen. While “20 years ago PCs were a novelty
and e-mail did not exist,” by the mid-1990’s most companies were fully
embracing e-mail and other forms of ESI as essential components of
Today, e-mail is a
business communications and operations.32
fundamental and economical form of internal and external communication
for many organizations.33 By some estimates, “more than 90 percent of all
information is created in an electronic format.”34 Moreover, the growth
rate of ESI is likely to accelerate rapidly over the next decade.35
[15] As the veritable tidal wave of ESI hits, companies are learning of its
dark side through the often painful experience of trying to harness it for
use and production in litigation. In theory, at least, many of the problems
caused by advances in technology also can be solved or at least minimized
by those same advances.36 Electronic data can be difficult to manage, but
it “can also greatly reduce the costs of discovery and facilitate the pretrial
preparation process.”37 When properly employed, “electronic discovery
allows a party to organize, identify, index, and even authenticate

32

THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 1.
See, e.g., Byers v. Illinois State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *10
(N.D. Ill. May 31, 2002) (“E-mails have replaced other forms of communication besides
just paper-based communication. Many informal messages that were previously relayed
by telephone or at the water cooler are now sent via e-mail.”)
34
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 1.
35
Richard K. Herrmann, Vincent J. Poppiti & David K. Sheppard, Managing Discovery
in the Digital Age: A Guide to Electronic Discovery in the District of Delaware, 8 DEL. L.
REV. 75, 75 (2005).
36
David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, at
II. H. 1 (Feb. 2005).
37
RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, CONFERENCE
OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION iv (Review Draft, Sept. 2005).
33
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documents in a fraction of the time and at a fraction of the cost of paper
discovery while virtually eliminating costs of copying and transport.”38
[16] To that end, in recent years companies and counsel have taken
advantage of one of the positive features of electronic data: its
searchability. One of the most effective ways to reduce a large collection
of data is through an electronic culling and vetting process.39 ESI search
technologies and software allow litigants to “search through far more
documents than human beings could hope to review manually.”40 While
courts have, to some extent, endorsed search technology in discovery, the
cases still lag far behind the available technology.
[17] This section suggests pragmatic, innovative approaches to reducing
the costs of the ESI discovery process, in furtherance of the “just, speedy,
and inexpensive” resolution of parties’ disputes. It focuses on the two
most costly and burdensome aspects of ESI discovery: document
preservation and attorney review. It also briefly discusses the need for
companies to implement rigorous controls over data lifecycle management
so that their electronically stored information does not become so
voluminous as to be unmanageable when litigation hits. With these
approaches, companies and counsel can make use of the special features of
ESI to work toward fulfilling the mandate of FRCP 1.
[18] Even with the cost-cutting measures that search technologies provide,
however, the fact remains that the more and more ESI there is to search,
“the more expensive it is to discover all the relevant information.”41 To
efficiently and effectively litigate in the electronic age, requesting parties
should focus their search efforts on identifying and producing the most
important portions of accessible and relevant ESI, rather than undertaking
the Herculean task of trying to find and produce all responsive ESI.
Conversely, requesting parties must give up the notion that they are
entitled to every shred of relevant evidence, no matter how tangential
38

Id. at iv-v.
Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-Discovery
Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH 53 (2004).
40
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 6.
41
Zubulake v.UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I).
39
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A. KEYWORD SEARCHING
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KEYWORD SEARCHING IN DISCOVERY
[19] Long before the discovery of electronically stored information
became part of everyday litigation, parties employed culling techniques
during the document collection and pre-review processing stages of
litigation to winnow down the overall volume of documents potentially
relevant to a given litigation. Typically, those filters involved date
parameters, custodians, and file types unlikely to contain relevant
information. But given the exponentially greater (and ever-increasing)
volume of ESI used and retained by companies in recent years, those
traditional restrictions are no longer proving sufficient: the amount of data
left to review is still often prohibitively colossal, sometimes numbering in
the terabytes. The “cost and time required to have legal professionals read
documents closely” for responsiveness, privilege, and other confidentiality
concerns, especially “in the context of cases involving hundreds of
thousands (or even millions) of pages of records, can be astronomical.”42
Moreover, with the continued proliferation of vast quantities of ESI, there
is an ever-increasing likelihood that responsive documents will not be
located and “that some privileged records may slip through the review
process.”43
[20] To minimize these problems, parties and their counsel can take
advantage of one of the more positive features of electronic data:
“because it can be searched automatically, key words can be run for
privilege checks” and to identify potentially responsive documents.44
“Keyword searching can, at least in theory, assist in all aspects of ediscovery.”45
[21] As discussed herein, a keyword search is a method for culling down a
large collection of ESI. The producing party searches the collection for
certain words, dates, or other parameters specified by a user and then—in
42

Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, 15 PRAT. LIT. 3, 9 (May 2004).
Id.
44
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
45
Bennett, supra note 42, at 10.
43
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the most common application today—eliminates from attorney review
those documents that do not contain those parameters. Keyword searching
“permits a party to search” a collection of documents “more efficiently.”46
Narrowing a pool of data by using keywords, such as names, e-mail
addresses, and business terms relevant to the subject matter of the
litigation, allows for a “targeted and focused discovery search.”47
[22] Parties should consider how keyword searches also may be used
beyond the context of the culling down of data before attorney review. A
“significant benefit” of keyword searching is the potential “reduction in
the burden and cost of electronic discovery (both in terms of locating and
preserving relevant records, and in terms of identifying potentially
privileged or confidential records).”48 Assuming that a company has or is
willing to acquire (through assistance of a vendor or otherwise)
technology that allows it to search for keywords in ESI, protocols can be
established to develop and deploy search terms to assist in the process of
identifying ESI to be preserved and/or collected for a particular litigation.
Keywords also could be used to facilitate a more efficient and effective
search for privileged, private, and confidential information in ESI.
[23] Keyword searches are appropriate for identifying potentially
At a minimum, keyword searching can
privileged documents.49
immediately identify documents that contain the words “privileged” or
“confidential.”50 A more sophisticated deployment of keyword searching
could locate documents containing the names of relevant counsel, or other
case-specific sensitive terms.51 Another appropriate situation to use
keyword searching is where opposing counsel demands production of
information on a specific subject.52 Keyword searching of ESI can also be
particularly helpful where opposing counsel demands production of
46

Windy City Innovations, LLC v. American Online, Inc., No. 04 C 4240, 2006 WL
2224057, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2006).
47
Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTS/RLE, 2006 WL
3208579, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006).
48
Bennett, supra note 42, at 12.
49
Id.; see also Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
50
Bennett, supra note 42, at 12.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 13.
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information on a specific subject. Applying traditional document
production techniques to that situation would require extensive, timeintensive, hands-on review of individual records one-by-one to identify
responsive documents.53 A keyword search, by contrast, would greatly
reduce the time and costs necessary to locate those documents.54
2. ENDORSEMENT OF KEYWORD SEARCHING AND FILTERING BY THE
COURTS
[24] There is no real dispute that keyword searching, along with traditional
filters such as date, custodian, and file type, can streamline the production
of ESI.55 Courts increasingly have endorsed the use of keyword searches
and filters as a necessary component of discovery.56 The use of search
terms to reduce the volume of ESI at issue in a particular litigation matter
“strikes a reasonable balance” between a requesting party’s needs and a
producing party’s burden.57 “Indeed, a principle advantage of electronic
information is that high-speed methods exist to determine the existence of
patterns of words, thereby allowing the narrowing of searches for relevant
information.”58
[25] A growing body of law acknowledges and endorses the use of
“performing a key word search,” to cull down the volume of ESI to be
reviewed by attorneys, to “control costs” in the review and production of
53

Id.
Id.
55
See, e.g., In re CV Therapeutics, Inc., Sec. Litig, No. C-03-3709 SI 2006 WL 2458720,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (“Employment of search terms is a reasonable means of
narrowing [production].”); FTC v. Ameridebt, Inc., No. C-058025JSWEDL, 2006 WL
618563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2006) (noting that “e-mail could likely be screened
efficiently through the use of electronic search terms that the parties agreed upon”).
56
Exceptions to this rule have related to circumstances where keyword searching was not
feasible due to the nature of the storage medium. Yet notably, even these cases recognize
that if keyword searching had been feasible, it would have been appropriate. See, e.g.
Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. 97-192, 1999 WL 815818, at *11 (Mass. Aug. 27, 1999).
57
In re CV Therapeutics, 2006 WL 2458720, at *2.
58
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 44. See also Lombardo v. Broadway Stores,
Inc., No. G026581, 2002 WL 86810, at *8 (Cal. App. Jan. 22, 2002) (“Broadway urges
the hard copy payroll documents were the same as the computerized data. Not so. The
hard copy may have contained the same information, but the information was not equally
accessible.”).
54
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documents.59
The increasing familiarity of litigants with search
technology—and with keyword searching in particular—has resulted in its
adoption as an integral part of discovery in many cases. In Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, the court noted that “[p]roducing
electronic data requires, at a minimum, . . . designing and applying a
search program to identify potentially relevant electronic files.”60
Commentators proffer that “[n]o sophisticated party or attorney seriously
contends that an electronic vetting process is unnecessary.”61
[26] Case law makes it clear, however, that while keyword searches may
be employed to more efficiently identify potentially relevant documents
and cull down collections in a particular litigation, that should be done
only after careful consideration of what keywords should be used.62 When
keywords are properly developed, some courts are enthusiastic about the
use of search terms in document review and production, deeming the
procedure fair, efficient, and reasonable.63 It has also become common for
courts and parties alike to fashion unique, individualized discovery
protocols incorporating the use of keyword terms.64

59

Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 576 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 552 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
61
Brownstone, supra note 39, at 26.
62
See, e.g., Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157-JTM-DWB, 2006 WL
763668, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (noting the importance of formulating a detailed
search protocol).
63
Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., No. CIV. A. 00-981-RRM, 2002
WL 818061 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002)
64
Id; see also Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). In Rowe, in light of the court’s decision to shift the costs of the
discovery of e-mails to the plaintiffs, the court also decided to shift the responsibility for
search, review, and even production of the e-mails to plaintiffs, the requesting party. The
court directed plaintiffs’ counsel to formulate a search procedure for identifying
responsive e-mails, including specific word searches. Id. Plaintiffs were also responsible
for reviewing the documents elicited by the search, identifying the e-mails they
considered relevant, and providing those documents to defendants’ counsel in hard copy
form with Bates stamps. Defendants were permitted an after-the-fact opportunity to
review the documents produced in order to designate them for privilege and
confidentiality. The court dismissed with privilege waiver concerns by holding that the
fact that “a document has been reviewed by [opposing] counsel or by the expert shall not
constitute a waiver of any claim of privilege or confidentiality.” Id.
60
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[27] There is a key question, however, that has not yet been addressed in
depth by courts: may a responding party act “unilaterally” in creating and
deploying search terms to winnow down a pool of data, or must there be a
“bilateral” agreement between parties regarding search criteria before
action is taken?
[28] A good-faith unilateral approach to the development of keywords for
filtering and culling ESI should be defensible in light of the wellestablished principle that it is the province of the party producing material
to “determine what is responsive to discovery demands.”65 As one court
noted, this may “range from reading every word of every document to
conducting a series of targeted key word searches,” but either way, “the
producing party unilaterally decides on the review protocol.”66 The
review protocol to be unilaterally developed by the producing party
logically should include “defining the set of data” to be reviewed by
selecting “reasonable search criteria, including search terms.”67 Sedona
Principle No. 6 acknowledges the soundness of this approach:
“[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures,
methodologies and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing
their own electronic data and documents.”68
[29] Some courts have endorsed a unilateral approach to deciding upon
and employing search terms.69 Others, however, have required that the
requesting party have an opportunity to provide “input . . . regarding
Interestingly, even those courts still
proposed search terms.”70
acknowledge that the producing party, “as custodian[] of the computer
65

THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 31.
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III).
67
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 31.
68
Id. at I, §6.
69
See, e.g. Benson v. St. Joseph Reg'l Health Ctr., No. H-04-04323, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28795, at *14 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2006) (denying a motion to compel a full
search of documents and for explanation of how the producing party searched archived
material for documents and e-mails responsive to the requests, the court held that it was
“unnecessary for [the producing party] to explain the details of their method of searching,
when they have certified and represented to the Court that they have complied fully with
[the requesting party’s] requests and made reasonable efforts to find and disclose all
responsive documents and emails”).
70
In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litg., 233 F.R.D. 88, 91 (D. Conn. 2005).
66
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files,” “shall be responsible for . . . sifting through the data for responsive
information” and may do so “in the most efficient manner possible.” Thus
while it may be permissible for a producing party to develop a list of
keywords unilaterally to structure its search for responsive ESI, it may be
preferable for that party to make some sort of effort to involve the
requesting party in bilateral discussions before the search terms are
deployed.
[30] Treppel v. Biovail Corp. is an example of this approach.71 In Treppel,
the court first relied on a line of cases to conclude that, compared to “hard
copy” document review and production, keyword searching to filter and
cull down a document collection is “more appropriate in cases involving
electronic data, where the number of documents may be exponentially
greater.”72 Biovail, the producing party, initially sought the plaintiff’s
input in “defining the scope of any review of electronic records by
stipulating which files would be searched and what search terms would be
utilized.” Treppel declined, however, “apparently believing that ‘the use
of search terms has no application to the standard discovery process of
locating and producing accessible hard copy and electronic documents.’”73
The court deemed that a “missed opportunity” for the plaintiff, but still
chided Biovail for failing to deploy its search protocol, noting that
“[a]bsent agreement” with the plaintiff, “Biovail should have proceeded
unilaterally” and produced “all responsive documents located by its
search.”74 The court then ruled that Treppel could weigh in with “any
specific concerns about the scope of the search.”75
[31] Likewise, in In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., the court ordered
the defendant to disclose to the plaintiff the search terms it used to reduce
the “universe of extant electronic records in this case,” to give the plaintiff

71

Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 374 (citing a line of cases approving keyword searches, including United States
ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., No. 02 C 6074, 2005 WL 3111972, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 21, 2005) (approving of parties’ stipulated search terms to review e-mails)).
73
Treppel, 233 F.R.D. at 374.
74
Id. at 374.
75
Id. at 375.
72
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“an avenue to test or assess the scope of the search terms” used.76 When
the plaintiff contested the adequacy of the search terms, however, the
court held that the defendant’s unilateral development and use of keyword
searches was a “reasonable means of narrowing the production in this
instance” in light of the requesting party’s failure to “set forth an
alternative search methodology” or otherwise bring any “specific
challenge to the search terms.”77
[32] Many cases are even more explicit about requiring parties to
negotiate a mutually agreeable keyword list for filtering and culling as part
of the discovery planning process, rather than proceed unilaterally.78 The
trend toward bilateral discussions regarding, and/or mutual agreement in,
the use of keyword search methodologies may find additional support in
the recent amendments to the FRCP concerning discovery of
electronically stored information, effective December 1, 2006
(“Amendments”), which place emphasis on addressing discovery
protocols openly, and as early as possible, in the litigation.79
[33] There are, in sum, no bright-line rules regarding the development and
use of keyword searches by a producing party. It may well be that as the
volume of ESI exponentially increases and it becomes more and more
infeasible to conduct attorney review of ESI without first substantially
culling down the data, keyword searching will become a standard
component of litigants’ joint discovery plans. In the meanwhile,
76

In re CV Therapeutics Sec. Litig., No. C-03-3709 SI 2006 WL 2458720, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 22, 2006).
77
Id.
78
See, e.g. Balboa Threadworks, Inc. v. Stucky, No. 05-1157-JTM-DWB, 2006 WL
763668, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2006) (requiring parties to meet and confer in an attempt
to agree on a formulation of appropriate search protocol, whether they would use
keyword searches and/or other search procedures, and advising parties to “lean heavily
on their respective computer experts in designing such a protocol”); Analog Devices, Inc.
v. Michalski, No. 01 CVS 10614, 2006 WL 3287382 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006)
(directing producing party to conduct a word search using agreed-upon terms); United
States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., No. 02 C 6074, 2005 WL 3111972, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2005) (endorsing negotiated keyword terms to be used in the review
and production of e-mails).
79
Brownstone, supra note 39 (advocating pre-production collaboration regarding specific
selection criteria to be used in searches of the electronic data set).
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producing parties should be free to take the lead in selecting and deploying
keyword terms,80 keeping in mind that they may best follow the spirit and
directives of FRCP 1 by being up-front with the opposing party regarding
proposed search terms (and receptive to its input). Where that is not
possible, the producing party should, in an organized, methodical, and
defensible fashion, unilaterally develop and use a keyword list to reduce
the costs and burdens associated with attorney review of ESI.81
3. MOVING BEYOND CASE LAW: USE OF KEYWORD SEARCHING IN
DOCUMENT PRESERVATION
[34] While the use of keyword searching in discovery is generally
accepted by courts, that judicial endorsement has, to date, mainly been
limited to the pre-review culling phase. Long before any ESI is collected
or culled, however, keyword searches may offer similar efficiency benefits
for the preservation of potentially relevant ESI, which is fast becoming a
very complex and costly stage of discovery.82
(A) THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF DOCUMENT PRESERVATION
[35] While the duty to preserve evidence in the face of pending or
anticipated litigation is not new,83 the explosion of ESI has deepened the
impact of that duty. The proliferation of e-mail and other forms of ESI in
80

THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 31 (“There is no principled reason to require
more intrusive efforts merely because the party seeking discovery is suspicious of the
efforts undertaken by the producing party.”); see also McCurdy Group, LLC v. Am.
Biomedical Group, Inc., 9 Fed. Appx. 822, 831 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of
motion to compel production of hard drives based on that party’s expression of
skepticism that all relevant and non-privileged documents had been produced).
81
Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
82
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 6; see also Isom, supra note 36.
83
A party on notice that documents and information in its possession are relevant to
pending or anticipated litigation matter has a duty to preserve those documents and data.
See, e.g., Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (“While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its
possession once a complaint is filed, it is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or
reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery,
and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request.”); JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL.,
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 3.11, 93 n.125 (1989 & Cumulative Supp. 2006).
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corporations has increased exponentially the volume of data potentially
relevant to any litigation.84 This presents a particular challenge for large
corporations that are constantly litigating multiple actions across different
areas of law and various company departments. Large companies have
worked hard to keep up with their duty to preserve evidence, but it has
been difficult and costly. Each time a new litigation matter arises, or an
existing matter expands in scope, the company is expected to initiate or
expand a “litigation hold” on any manual or automatic processes that
might delete relevant information, while the disposal of all non-relevant
information continues.85 The decision of what to include in the scope of a
“litigation hold” is thus of great importance.86 Once the scope of a
litigation hold has been determined, it is up to a party and its counsel to
take reasonable steps to see that sources of information within the scope
are located and actually placed on hold during implementation.87
[36] There is no entirely risk-free approach to preserving ESI for
litigation. While many companies traditionally have attempted to take a
mechanical “save everything” approach to reduce the risk of spoliation,
they now are realizing that saving “everything” is simply no longer
feasible in light of the colossal volume of ESI, nor is it even a good idea.
Over time, that approach eventually would compromise the company’s
ability to meet its obligation to preserve and produce relevant evidence in
litigation: as the volume of data being “held” for litigation grows to an
84

Mia Mazza & Ashley Sternberg, “Good Faith” Safe Harbor of FRCP 37(f) to Prevent
Drowning in Zubulake?, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., COMM. ON TRIAL EVIDENCE 1 (Winter
2007).
85
See, e.g. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(Zubulake IV) (“Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine
document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the
preservation of relevant documents.”); DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing,
Inc., No. 03-72265, 2005 WL 3502172 , at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005) (“[N]ormal
procedures for destruction of documents must . . . be suspended when a party is on notice
that they may be relevant to litigation, and the failure to make an adequate search of such
documents before their destruction may be evidence of bad faith.”); Rambus, Inc. v.
Infineon Tech., 220 F.R.D. 264, 281 (E.D. Va. 2004).
86
Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84.
87
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake
V); see also Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic. Res. Corp., 446 F.Supp.2d 205 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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unmanageable size, it becomes increasingly difficult to find the
information that is “relevant” to any particular case.88
[37] The need for a more efficient and effective approach to preservation
has been driven home for companies by the increased rate at which
requesting parties are seeking sanctions for alleged spoliation of ESI.89 A
range of negative consequences can follow from a company’s failure to
preserve evidence, including monetary sanctions, evidence or issue
preclusion, adverse inference jury instructions, and even outright
dismissal.90 One notorious example is Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.91
In April 2005, a jury awarded damages of more than $29 million against
UBS Warburg (“UBS”) after the court ruled that UBS’s preservation
efforts had failed to prevent the disposal of certain relevant, responsive
documents and gave the jury an adverse inference instruction.92
[38] In light of cases like Zubulake and the evolving complexity of ESI,
companies are now taking more substantial steps than in the past to ensure
proper document preservation and to avoid discovery sanctions. This
means that companies and counsel must make critical decisions early on—
often before any litigation is filed—about where potentially relevant ESI
may be located, and what must be done to preserve it for litigation. For
large companies that create high volumes of ESI and that are constantly in
numerous litigation matters at once, compliance with (and concern about)
88

See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (holding that requiring a company to retain
every shred of electronic and paper documents upon notice of potential litigation would
“cripple large corporations” who are “almost always involved in litigation”).
89
See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to
preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable
litigation.”).
90
See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding a
dismissal the appropriate sanction for plaintiff’s failure to discharged duty to prevent
spoliation of evidence); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 291 (E.D. Va.
2001) (holding that adverse inferences respecting substantive testimony and credibility of
experts was the appropriate sanction for spoliation). Further, any knowing destruction of
documents sought in litigation may be punished by lengthy prison sentences. See, e.g. 18
U.S.C. § 1512 (c).
91
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 422.
92
Id. at 439-40. See Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84 (discussing Zubulake, new Rule
37(f), and their implications for future cases involving sanctions for spoliation).

19

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 3

the rigor now required in document preservation can be overwhelming.
That has translated into a phenomenon of companies spending a great deal
of time and money on the purchase and implementation of additional
software, hardware, and other technology infrastructure, and the hiring of
personnel tasked solely with the responsibility of preserving ESI for
litigation, in an attempt to increase the likelihood that sources of
potentially relevant ESI will be identified and retained for each new
litigation matter that arises.93 This costly practice simply cannot be
reconciled with the mandates of FRCP 1.
[39] Rule 37(f), adopted with the FRCP Amendments, provides that
sanctions under Rule 37 cannot be imposed on a party “for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system,” absent
exceptional circumstances.94 The Advisory Committee note to Rule 37(f)
does not shed any light on what qualifies as “the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system,” but it may signal a shift
away from essentially expecting parties to do a perfect job of preserving
ESI for litigation and toward a focus on whether parties have exercised
“good faith” in their efforts to preserve potentially relevant ESI.95
(B) KEYWORD SEARCHING AS PART OF A REASONABLE, GOOD-FAITH
APPROACH TO DOCUMENT PRESERVATION
[40] In light of the excessive costs and burdens now associated with
document preservation, courts have acknowledged and held that
companies need not preserve “every scrap of paper” in their files to
comply with preservation obligations.96 Companies can only strive to
93

See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 14, cmt. 2.b (“[T]he non monetary
costs,” including “the burdens on information technology personnel and the resources
required to review documents” should also be considered). For example, large
companies are now commonly finding it necessary to purchase a server whose sole
purpose is to store preserved data for a particular litigation, which alone can cost nearly
half a million dollars, or more. Telephone Interview with Discovery Vendor (Dec. 12,
2006).
94
FED R. CIV PRO. 37(f)
95
See Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84.
96
Danis v. USN Comm., Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
23, 2000).
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make reasonable, good-faith efforts to preserve ESI for litigation, and that
includes the process by which they locate potentially responsive ESI to be
preserved.97 Zubulake anticipated that companies would need to “be more
creative” in the way they locate documents within the scope of their duty
to preserve.98 “In recognition of the fact that there are many ways to
manage electronic data,” the court stated that “litigants are free to choose
how [the task of preserving relevant documents] is accomplished.”99
[41] Sedona Principle 11 also reflects the need for innovative solutions in
the preservation context:
A responding party may satisfy its good faith obligation to
preserve and produce potentially responsive electronic data
and documents by using electronic tools and processes,
such as data sampling, searching, or the use of selection
criteria, to identify data most likely to contain responsive
information.100
The key factor is that companies undertake the preservation obligation in a
reasonable, good-faith, well thought-out manner, in consideration of the
facts of the litigation at issue.101 Decisions “relating to legal standards like
‘potentially relevant data’ are made every day by lawyers in a wide variety
of contexts.”102 This includes companies and their counsel making
judgment calls regarding which methods are reasonable and which are far

97

Bennett, supra note 42, at 10.
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
99
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
100
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5 at 39, prin. 11.
101
Id. at 27, cmt 6.b. (“[O]rganizations should define the scope of the data needed to
appropriately and fairly address the issues in the case and to avoid unreasonable
overbreadth, burden, and cost. Important steps in achieving the goal of reasonably
limiting discovery may include collecting data from repositories used by key players
rather than generally searching through the entire corporate computer system; defining
the set of data to be collected by applying reasonable selection criteria, including search
terms.”).
102
John L. Carroll & Kenneth J. Withers, Observations on “The Sedona Principles,” at 4
(Apr. 2003), available at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/sedona/observations.pdf.
98
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too burdensome to endure. When electronic records are voluminous, a
keyword search should be employed where feasible.103
[42] Through the use of keyword search technologies, a company may
gain some assurance that it has made adequate good-faith efforts to
comply with its obligation to locate and preserve potentially relevant
information, while at the same time avoiding “the overwhelming burden
of either preserving everything that exists in electronic form, or
conducting a laborious page-by-page review of electronic records to
determine what must be preserved.”104
[43] Zubulake is in accord.105 There, the court explicitly suggested that in
fulfilling the preservation obligation counsel should consider using a
system-wide keyword search to locate potentially relevant documents.106
A copy of each “hit” could then be preserved and segregated to provide a
pool of potentially relevant documents for later responses to discovery
requests.107
[44] Where keyword search technology is employed to facilitate document
preservation, parties should consider adopting a more conservative
approach than they would in the review stage of discovery. This is
because the filtering out of documents that do not meet various keyword
search criteria will be permanent. The parties will not have the ability to
go back and redefine the scope of their search terms, as they would during
the review stage, so companies and their counsel should choose
objectively broad criteria to guard against potential spoliation claims. In
other words, when using keywords for preservation purposes, search terms
should be constructed with the intent of reaching ESI that is potentially
relevant, and not just ESI that is relevant, in order to maximize
defensibility.108 (Later on, a narrower set of keyword search terms should
be applied to cull down the data set to a volume that feasibly may be
103

Bennett, supra note 42, at 10.
Id. at 11.
105
Zubulake V, 299 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Wm. T.
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
104
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reviewed by attorneys.) To that end, companies should consider keyword
searching as a tool to be used in conjunction with traditional preservation
efforts such as identifying relevant custodians and locating the ESI that
they created and reviewed during the relevant time period.
[45] In further support of defensibility, a party should make sure there is
quality control and oversight in executing keyword searches. If it appears
that a particular search is not returning responsive documents, a company
should modify its search parameters or take other measures to ensure
appropriate preservation. Also, a party should carefully document the
search protocol employed. These, along with any other visible efforts a
company can make to show that it made reasonable efforts to fulfill its
preservation obligation in good faith, should go a long way toward
warding off any future claims of spoliation, and position a party to invoke
the protections in new FRCP 37(f).109
4. LIMITATIONS OF KEYWORD SEARCHING
[46] While keyword searching has been embraced by courts, counsel, and
parties alike, it is by no means an “e-discovery panacea.”110 There are
challenging problems associated with using keyword searching, many of
which are inherent to the available technology. Perhaps foremost among
the limitations of keyword searching is the risk that the chosen search
terms will result in a low recall rate of potentially relevant documents.111
109

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system.”).
110
Bennett, supra note 42, at 13.
111
The recall rate “is a measure of the ability of a given retrieval methodology to find all
of the potential responsive documents in a given collection.” Jason R. Baron, Toward a
Federal Benchmarking Standard for Evaluating Information Retrieval Products Used in
E-Discovery, 6 SEDONA CONFERENCE J. 237, 242 (2005). Recall and precision are
important performance measurement terms in information retrieval. See Matt Deniston,
Concept Searching Whitepaper, at 4 (Jan. 2003),
http://www.litigationready.com/pdfFiles/concept_searching.pdf. (“Precision is a measure
of the system’s ability to return only relevant documents from amongst all the documents
in a given collection. It answers the question, ‘Is what I found relevant to what I was
looking for?’ For example, if a search engine lists 80 documents found to match a query
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Lawyers and experts struggle with formulating keyword search terms that
will locate the largest possible number of potentially relevant documents
without generating so many “hits” that the company essentially must
preserve or review everything.
[47] First, people often do not use the same terms to describe the same
idea. It can be very difficult, if not impossible in some circumstances, to
identify every single word that relates to a relevant topic. Consequently,
keyword searches often fail to be as broad as a particular concept requires.
For example, a keyword search could include “car,” but neglect
“automobile,” “Jeep,” or “wheels.” Because a keyword search is only as
broad as the exact terms used, it is safe to assume that it will miss, or fail
to recall, many relevant documents.
[48] Second, anyone who has ever used a Boolean search engine knows
the importance and the difficulty of framing queries to maximize the recall
rate of responsive documents. Building proper queries is a crucial step in
the discovery process when keyword searches are employed to locate
relevant documents. It “requires mastering the subtleties of ANDing and
ORing terms in order to arrive at a list of documents worth reviewing.”112
In addition, varying search engines often require slightly differing
syntaxes for the construction of Boolean search terms. Accordingly,
converting document requests into “a syntactically correct Boolean query”
can challenge “even the most seasoned expert searcher.”113 In the words
of one court, “[k]eyword searches are limited because they are literal and
search only for an exact sequence of characters. Thus, they do not pick up

but only 20 of them are relevant, then the Precision would be 25%. Recall is a measure
of how well the system can find all of the relevant documents in the database. It answers
the question, ‘How much is out there?’ For example, there may be 100 matching
documents, but a search engine may only find 80 of them. It would then list these 80 and
have a recall of 80%.”) Id. at 3.
Id. The relationship between recall and precision “is an inverse one: increasing the recall
rate invariably leads to a corresponding loss of precision, as more and more documents
are retrieved to find the elusive remaining needle in the rest of the haystack.” Baron, at 4.
112
Deniston, supra note 111, at 3.
113
Id.
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variations or misspellings of words or names.” 114 These kinds of errors
easily can lead to protracted discovery disputes later on down the road.115
[49] Third, keyword searching naturally results in “false positives,”
making any given search overinclusive from the outset. For example, the
word “water” may also bring up search results that are totally unrelated to
the meaning of the word you are searching for, such as “Water St.,”
“watered down,” or “John Waters.” When dealing with a large universe of
documents, it can be problematic when a keyword search generates “large
numbers of nonresponsive records (along with responsive ones), all of
which [need] to be sorted out through a labor-intensive manual review
process.”116 This kind of result may, to some extent, defeat the efficiency
rationales behind using a keyword search in the first place.117
[50] Finally, it is important for a company to recognize that in all
likelihood it will need to perform multiple keyword searches across its
various data systems, as equipment and platforms are not always
compatible. “Unfortunately, there is no simple ‘universal translator’ for
all this information.”118 When electronic information is maintained in
different formats and stored in multiple locations, separate searches are
typically required for each format and location.119 In many locations,
keyword searching may not be feasible at all.120
114

United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 50 (D. Conn. 2002).
See, e.g., Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI , 2005 WL 679071, at *7 (entering default judgment against
producing party for a host of discovery abuses, including failure to identify and timely
disclose script errors in search terms that prevented it from locating responsive
documents).
116
Baron, supra note 111, at 237 (describing in detail the problems arising from
overbroad keyword searches in two cases).
117
Id.
118
Bennett, supra note 42, at 14.
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31, 50 (D. Conn.
2002) (“Keyword searches are also limited because they cannot be conducted on all files,
such as image files that contain scanned documents or faxes.”). See also Public Citizen,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[B]ecause the database that
was searched could not be relied upon to contain the requested information, it follows
that no amount of searches of that database could be relied upon to turn up that
information.”).
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[51] Companies will need to account for the deficiencies associated with
keyword searching and adapt their procedures accordingly. Deciding what
to search for and executing the search must be the result of intensive
strategy considerations.
It is a challenging task, but is not
insurmountable.121 The search terms employed “must be reasonably
calculated to return relevant data.”122 It may even be necessary to engage
an expert who could ensure that the search terms are properly constructed
and are compatible with all relevant systems. If the search is not done
properly, courts may order additional searches, which will increase the
cost and burden of discovery.”123
B. CONCEPT SEARCHING
[52] There can be no doubt that electronic search methodologies, as a
means of culling down a data set for discovery, are here to stay. While
keyword searching certainly has its place in winnowing down ESI in a
cost-effective and speedy manner, and the technology currently is
available through many vendors and software providers, it also leaves
something to be desired in terms of both recall and precision.124 Another,
more recent development in search technology is concept searching, a
promising alternative or complement to keyword searching.
[53] As of this writing, concept search tools have not been developed or
marketed widely for integration into corporate computer systems and thus
they typically are not used in-house for preservation or other initial stages
of discovery. Concept search technology software, however, currently is
available (at a price) for use in litigation to cull down and/or organize
collections of ESI before attorney review.
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Bennett, supra note 42, at 13.
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 54.
123
Id.; see also In re Amsted Indus., Inc., No. 01 C 2963, 2002 WL 31844956, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2002) (ordering additional, comprehensive searches after finding word
searches already employed to be insufficient.).
124
See Deniston, supra, note 111, at 14.
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1. CONCEPT SEARCH TECHNOLOGY
[54] Concept search technology takes keywords to a whole new level.
Unlike keyword search systems that match precisely what you type in and
nothing more, “concept search systems strive to determine what you
mean.”125 Concept searching aims to improve upon the performance
limitations of keyword searching by using sophisticated statistical and
linguistic models to understand the meaning behind search terms. This is
done by identifying word patterns and occurrences in documents, which
are then translated into “concepts.”126 The concept search tool then
compares those “concepts” across the document set, looking for
relationships between documents.127
[55] Unlike traditional Boolean operators like “AND,” “OR,” and “!,”
concept searching does not require any particular syntax or formatting.
Users can enter words, sentences, even whole documents (such as
document requests or complaints), and the technology will return a list of
potentially related documents, often ranked by relevancy, or of custodians
with the most “hits.”128 By allowing lawyers to search for ideas as well as
words, potentially relevant documents can be located even if specifically
identified keywords do not appear in them. Conversely, concept search
engines are “smart enough” to exclude irrelevant documents even if a
potentially relevant “concept” does appear in them.129 For example, if a
reviewer entered “‘fired from job’ into a concept search engine, the engine
is smart enough to exclude information such as flames, smoke and
fireplaces. The concept search will also expand the search to dismissal,
separation, layoff, suspension, etc.”130 Essentially, concept searching is
akin to “using a massive dictionary of the English language to find
synonyms and related words.’”131 Many concept search tools also operate
much like a massive dictionary of the language used by a company and in
125

Id. at 2.
Kristin M. Nimsger & Michele C. S. Lange, E is for Evidence: Examining Recent EDiscovery Developments, 23 NO. 2 GPSOLO 40, 44 (Mar. 2006).
127
Id.
128
Telephone Interview with Discovery Technology Vendor (Dec. 14, 2006).
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Deniston, supra note 109, at 2.
130
Id.
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Baron, supra note 111, at 240.
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the larger document collection being searched, for example to identify
code names for projects or nicknames for people at the company.
[56] There are several different theoretical approaches to finding data
through concept searching.
There are mathematical or statistical
132
approaches, which often use probability applications to locate and rank
related topics. Other approaches include linguistics or taxonomy.133 Each
has its own set of strengths and weaknesses.134 Accordingly, most concept
search software blends together some combination of the approaches to fit
the needs of a particular litigation and to optimize precision and recall of
relevant documents.135 The goal is for the technology to come as close as
possible “to modeling how humans parse text for semantic meaning.”136
[57] When combined with traditional Boolean keyword searching, these
search technologies provide a powerful tool for lawyers to substantially
reduce the costs of discovery. The technologies allow litigants to decrease
significantly the amount of material that must be reviewed by attorneys (or
preserved in the first instance), and allow lawyers to identify and review
the most relevant documents more quickly and accurately. “Theoretically,
as technology improves, retrieving and searching data will become more
standard and less costly.”137

132

Deniston, supra note 111, at 4-9 (discussing different mathematical and statistical
models used in concept search technology and stating that mathematical models are better
are handling large data collections (measured in terabytes) than other approaches).
133
Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006). A taxonomy approach relies on an
“if this, then that” approach. For example, with the word “pitch” you would retrieve
general categories such as baseball, roofing, sales, etc. If you next selected “baseball,”
you would get “fastball,” “curve,” “throw,” and so on, all clustered around baseball. A
linguistic approach, in addition to focusing on context and circumstances of use of words
in language, relies on statistical applications and also looks at the practices and activities
in which the words and phrases are used.
134
Id.
135
Telephone Interview, supra note 126. Indeed, the concept search tools that many
vendors use are a blend of mathematical, statistical, and linguistic approaches.
136
Deniston, supra note 111, at 8.
137
Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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2. HOW CONCEPT SEARCHING CAN AMPLIFY THE EFFICIENCIES OF
KEYWORD SEARCHING
[58] Concept searching is able to do what keyword searching does, and
more. Among experts, it is thought to be a better and more useful
application in that it may offer parties a better chance than keyword
searching of locating relevant documents.138 A concept search will return
documents that relate to the same idea as the query word, sentence, or
paragraph, making it arguably a more reliable method of locating
responsive documents.139
[59] Keyword searching is a great “brute force” way to find exact
matches.140 If litigants need to identify documents containing certain
names or terms, then keyword searching can be an essential and powerful
tool to find that information.141 If, on the other hand, a party needs to
identify responsive documents and has a less refined sense of which
documents could be responsive, then concept searching might be a better
option. For example, upon receiving a document request, rather than
constructing and executing complex keyword searches, concept searching
would let a party copy and paste the relevant part(s) of the request into the
search software. Shortly thereafter the party would have a list of every
conceptually-related document, including documents that didn’t contain
any of the specific words that were “pasted” into the software.142
[60] The use of concept searching in discovery is, to the knowledge of the
authors, currently limited to attorney review and (in fewer instances) prereview culling. As the technology becomes more widely available,
however, it also could be useful in identifying documents to preserve for
anticipated litigation. As discussed above, the preservation obligation
presents a vexing challenge for large companies that, at the time the duty
138

Telephone Interview with Discovery Vendor (Nov. 27, 2006); Telephone Interview
with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group on Methods for Search
and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006).
139
Id. Most search technologies allow for further control of the returned results, such as
de-duplication or grouping of emails by custodian or chain.
140
Deniston, supra note 111, at 3.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 2.
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to preserve arises, may not have received a complaint or preservation
letter. Yet, they are nevertheless expected to identify and safeguard all
information that may turn out to be potentially relevant.143 Concept
searching could be used as a tool or safeguard mechanism in this context
by counsel, along with traditional preservation methods, to ensure the
widest recall of potentially relevant documents. For example, counsel
could paste phrases and paragraphs from a complaint, preservation letter,
or newspaper article into the search tool, and the concept search would
identify relevant documents and further detail which custodians had the
greatest number of relevant document “hits.” This could serve as a
starting point for preservation, or as a final sweep, depending on the
situation.
[61] Using concept search technology instead of keyword searching is
particularly appropriate in cases that cannot be easily reduced to specific
terminology, or that are complex in nature. For example, in cases that
center on wrongful behavior, such as sexual harassment, it can be
challenging to identify search terms that adequately describe harassing
behavior.144 Concept searching could locate relevant ESI that relates to,
rather than contains, specific words.
[62] Concept search technology could also be used to further minimize the
risk that the most sensitive documents—those that are privileged, private,
confidential, or otherwise protected from discovery—do not get into the
hands of the opposing party. Some commentators suggest that the nature
and volume of discovery in the era of electronic information make it likely
that old attorney-client privilege issues will need to be examined in a new
light.145 As the volume of documents requested and produced increases,
the results are twofold in the privilege context. First, privilege review is
more costly and time-consuming than ever. Second, even with a
comprehensive privilege review, the sheer volume of documents requested
and produced increases the risk of inadvertent disclosure of privileged
143

Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84.
See, e.g., Wiginton v. C.B. Richard Ellis, 229 F.R.D. 568, 570-72 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(noting the low responsive rate in a sexual harassment case where parties used agreedupon keyword list including “sex,” “kiss,” “breast,” “porn,” “behavior,” “discipline,”
“inappropriate,” and “oral”).
145
Isom, supra note 36, at 11.
144
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information.146 Instead of entering into potentially risky “quick peek”
agreements and in addition to “clawback” agreements,147 parties could use
concept search technology to supplement attorney review to guard against
the inadvertent disclosure of privileged and confidential documents. This
would be especially appropriate in a large matter, where all of the
confidential terms, such as attorneys’ names, are not known, and therefore
could be missed using a keyword search.
3. DEFENDING THE USE OF CONCEPT SEARCH TECHNOLOGY
[63] There is a perception that discovery of electronic information is the
“wild, wild west”148 of modern litigation. This largely may be due to the
fact that the development of technologies used in the discovery of
electronic information far outpaces the developing law of discovery.149 As
a result, many of the cutting-edge technologies available to meet the
demands of modern discovery have no judicial decisions to support their
employment. Litigants are therefore understandably wary of using them.
[64] Unlike keyword search technology, concept searching has not yet
been vetted by the courts. While keyword searching is familiar to judges,
“it’s very difficult to explain to a judge that a lawyer has searched
thoroughly when it’s difficult to explain how concept search technology
146

To some extent, the recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect
these new realities by enacting provisions that promote flexibility among parties and
increased protection with respect to privilege. For example, amendments to Rule
16(b)(6) contemplate an agreement for waiving privilege in a scheduling order.
Likewise, new Rule 26(f) makes specific reference to discovery planning around
privilege, as does Rule 26(b).
147
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, cmt. 10.d. (“In a ‘clawback’ (or ‘quick
peek’) production, documents are produced to the opposing party before or without a
review for privilege, confidentiality, or privacy. The key component of such a production
is the ‘clawback’ agreement, in which the parties set stringent guidelines and restrictions
to prevent the waiver of confidentiality and privilege. The assumption of the parties to
such a ‘clawback’ agreement is that if the requesting party finds a document that appears
to be privileged, the producing party can “claw back” the document without having
waived any privilege.”).
148
See Ross Chafin, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and
Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 115 (2006).
149
Isom , supra note 36, at 10.
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works.”150 Nevertheless, courts do recognize that there are various ways
to manage electronic documents, and thus many ways in which a party
may comply with its obligations.151 Parties are expected to conduct
reasonable and adequate searches of their data. So long as a party (or an
independent third party vendor) can demonstrate the reasonableness of the
approach employed for a given litigation, a party can defend its use of a
particular search technology. As concept searching technology becomes
standardized, and increasingly familiar to litigants, one may expect that
courts will demonstrate a willingness to adopt concept searching as part of
the discovery process.152
[65] This issue does, however, signal that where possible, a party should
attempt to discuss or negotiate appropriate search methodologies,
including concept searching, with the opposing party. Courts are far less
likely to question the propriety of a given search technology if both parties
are in agreement that it is reasonable to expect the search methods used
will retrieve relevant information. To the extent parties in litigation
determine that the use of concept search technology is a mutually
agreeable means for achieving both the producing and requesting parties’
goals of increasing speed and decreasing the cost of document production,
they also should discuss whether the cost of that technology should be
split rather than borne solely by the responding party.
[66] Moreover, critical to understanding and defending the use of costcutting search strategies is the recognition that it is impossible to frame
and execute any search strategy—human or technological—with
perfection. There is already a pronounced level of unreliability and
guesswork involved in a traditional full-scale document review process.
For example, sorting and reviewing documents by custodian and date can
be very problematic: from the reviewer’s perspective, the documents
appear randomly and often out of context, making it difficult to

150

Jason Krause, Grasping the Concept: The Best Tool for Discovery is Still a Good
Lawyer’s Brain, 91 A.B.A.J. 59, 59 (July, 2005).
151
See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also THE SEDONA
PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, cmt. 6.a.
152
See Bennett, supra note 42, at 16.
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consistently spot relevant documents.153 Likewise, it is difficult to ensure
consistency across the board where a bevy of reviewers, all with different
thought processes and judgments as to what may be relevant, are involved
in the document review.
[67] Technology will not solve these reliability concerns, but its goal is to
improve upon them and reduce the costs of discovery at the same time.154
Indeed, keyword and concept searching may make locating responsive
documents even more reliable insofar as the search results can organize
documents by their content.155 Concept-based review of documents
arguably allows for a speedier review with increased chances of spotting
relevant documents in context with one another and the document set as a
whole, thereby furthering the directives of FRCP 1. Ultimately, “the
technology may become so cheap and so ubiquitous that litigants may
demand” that keyword and concept searching “be adopted as an essential
part of most-e-discovery.”156
[68] But litigants looking for some kind of “holy grail” in search
technology will not find it.157 There is not, to date, any gold standard for
reliability in the discovery of electronic information. Even vendors of
search technology software are quick to point out that search technology is
not a solution in and of itself, and it only goes so far as the imagination
153

Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006).
154
Some studies comparing how human review measures up against automated search
techniques suggest that lawyers using only themselves as reviewers fail to do as well as
automated techniques in finding relevant documents. Baron, supra note 111, at 243. But
see Telephone Interview with Discovery Vendor (Nov. 27, 2006) (noting that other
studies indicate that even the most advanced tools may miss a large percentage of
documents that a human would have assessed to be relevant. Another cost-cutting review
option offered by vendors is a systemic automated document review that may eliminate a
“first-level review” by attorneys for responsive documents. This kind of review protocol
focuses on some of the challenges of search technology, namely, consistency and quality
assurance, both human nature challenges. Comprehensive studies are underway to test
the hypothesis that automated search and retrieval tools can “meet or beat existing human
search and retrieval techniques.”).
155
Baron, supra note 111 at 243.
156
Bennett, supra note 42, at 16.
157
Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006).
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and adeptness of the lawyer using it.158 As “with any technology, it is
imperative to perform frequent, thorough checks to make sure that the
searches are working,”159 perhaps by using a sampling method, as
suggested below. The needs of the litigation at issue should dictate what
technology gets used, and how, in order to strike the optimal balance
possible between recall and precision.160 The key to defensibility is that
litigants deploy these search strategies as part of a reasonable, good-faith,
well-documented discovery protocol. Lawyers must understand where the
search technology fits into that protocol and have confidence that they
have taken measures to ensure the quality of their searches.
C. SAMPLING
1. USE OF “SAMPLING” IN DISCOVERY TODAY
[69] Litigants have increasingly turned to “sampling” methodologies “to
narrow the burden of searching voluminous electronic data for relevant
information.”161 Sampling typically involves analyzing a small subset, or
sample, of a large amount of ESI, to assess the extent to which relevant
documents likely would be found within the remainder of the data. Like
concept and keyword searching, sampling is a method to help identify
what relevant data may reside in a given population, thereby reducing the
potential costs of ESI discovery. Unlike search technologies, however, the
goal of sampling is not solely to find potentially relevant data in a way that
lives up to performance measurement standards, but rather to make a
qualitative judgment as to whether it is worthwhile to conduct further
searches of stored electronic data.162 “By reviewing an appropriate sample
of a large body of electronic information, litigants can often determine the
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Jason Krause, Preventing E-Glitches: Understanding Search-Term Basics Ensures
More Thorough E-Discovery Compliance, 92 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (April, 2006).
160
Telephone Interview with contributing author to Sedona Conference’s Working Group
on Methods for Search and Retrieval (Dec. 8, 2006); Telephone Interview with Discovery
Vendor (Nov. 27, 2006).
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THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, cmt. 11.b.
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See, e.g., McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
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likelihood that a more comprehensive review of the materials will yield
useful information.”163
[70] Sampling methodologies increasingly have been accepted by courts
as an appropriate component of a strategy for determining the scope of
potentially relevant ESI in computer network backup tapes.164 Sampling
can greatly reduce discovery costs by determining which backup tapes are
likely to contain relevant documents, thereby potentially eliminating the
costly process of restoring large numbers of tapes and reviewing massive
amounts of data. Sampling further provides parties with an assessment of
the costs required to restore and review ESI. Armed with that knowledge,
courts can make a judgment first as to whether further discovery is
warranted, and second, as to which party should bear the costs of
restoration, review, and production.165 Accordingly, the growing trend is
for courts to use sampling methodologies to inform cost-shifting analysis
in discovery.166
2. NOT JUST FOR BACKUP TAPES: EXPANDING THE USE OF SAMPLING
[71] The judicial endorsement of sampling in discovery recognizes that the
law should not require parties to spend inordinate sums of money to
locate, process, and review massive amounts of hard-to-reach data with no
assurance that any meaningful portion of that data is relevant to the
163

THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, comment 11.b. See, e.g., McPeek, 212 F.R.D.
at 35 (declining to order additional searches of backup tapes where a “test run” using the
sampling method indicated it was unlikely that additional backup tapes contained
relevant data); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(determining the utility of processing archived material after employing a sampling
method using keyword terms).
164
See, e.g., Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hopson v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 245 (D. Md. 2005).
165
See, e.g., Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 574-77 (ordering that requesting party should bear
25%, and producing party 75%, of the costs associated with restoring, searching, and
managing data on backup tapes after the sampling method revealed costs associated with
restoring backup tapes and pertinent documents contained thereon); Zubulake IV, 217
F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Requiring the responding party to restore and produce
responsive documents from a small sample of backup tapes will inform the cost-shifting
analysis”).
166
See, e.g., Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 60103 (E.D. Wis. 2004). See infra Section IV.
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lawsuit. Yet most of the case law approving sampling arises in the context
of determining whether, and at which party’s cost, backup tapes should be
searched for relevant ESI.167 That limitation fails to appreciate that
sampling is not just for backup tapes—it can and should play a role in a
number of the stages of discovery:168
[72] Document Preservation: Sampling can be used to assist litigants in
defining the scope of their document preservation obligation. Sedona
Principle 11 explicitly endorses the use of data sampling as a reasonable
method by which a litigant may satisfy its good faith obligation to
preserve potentially relevant documents.169 The comments to Principle 11
explain how, for example, sampling may “reveal substantial redundancy
between sources (i.e., duplicate data is found in both locations) such that it
is reasonable for the organization to preserve and produce data from only
one of the sources.”170 Understanding whether relevant data resides on
voluminous, stored electronic data promotes cost-efficient, intelligent
decision-making. This serves the mandates of both FRCP 1 and the new
FRCP Amendments.
[73] Framing Document Production: Sampling also has potential as a
powerful negotiating tool for parties that disagree about the scope of a
reasonable discovery search or even regarding the scope of production.171
Rather than search through entire catalogues of extensive ESI for all
167

See, e.g., McPeek, 212 F.R.D. at 37; Delta Fin. Corp. v. KPMG LLP, 819 N.Y.S.2d
908, 917 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
168
See Herbert L. Roitblat, Electronic Discovery Pragmatics Under the New Rules, 5
(2006) (on file with authors).
169
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, princ. 11.
170
Id. at cmt. 11.a. See also Hussey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. Civ. A. 02-7099,
2004 WL 220845, *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2004) (holding that it was unnecessary to search
an electronic email archive when an identical paper archive had already been searched).
171
See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 04-1245-MLB-DWB, 2006 WL 3913444,
at *11 n.21 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006) (noting that in a dispute over a search of email on
backup tapes, the parties could have agreed to run a search of a small sample of e-mails
to assist the parties and the court in determining the likelihood that additional searches
would disclose important relevant information); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, No. 051203-WEB, 2006 WL 1174040 *6, (D. Kan. May 1, 2006) (ordering parties to confer on
whether sampling of electronic database would suffice as method to discern the relevancy
of data contained therein).
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relevant data, a producing party could offer a sample of its collection and
place the burden on the requesting party to show good cause for further
production.172 For example, a party could agree to produce relevant data
from a few key custodians as an initial sample, on the basis that any
subsequent discovery requests issued would be anchored to what was
learned from the initial production. In this vein, sampling could “shortcircuit the use of broad requests, multiple rounds of discovery, or multiple
depositions that would otherwise be needed to identify the truly responsive
documents.”173 These uses of sampling would help to ensure that
reasonably complete responses are provided to discovery requests while
reducing the burden and expense of discovery.174
[74] Quality Assurance: Sampling also may be used to “test the
effectiveness of the selection strategies used to identify documents to be
reviewed.”175 For example, a litigant could sample a portion of a
collection of electronic documents, review those documents for relevance,
then run its keyword or concept search in the same sample to compare the
results. Such a measure, taken proactively, could go a long way in both
demonstrating the legitimacy of the search technology employed and
showing that the party is using a good-faith, reasonable approach to
discovery protocols in general.
[75] In whatever discovery context sampling is employed, it is important
that litigants use it with diligence and document the protocols used. This
will help to defend against any future claims that the sampling was
specifically tailored to skew the results.176
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Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 682 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting a motion to
compel production of a sample of electronic data to one requesting party to assess
relevance to the issues of the case).
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Roitblat, supra note 168, at 5.
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Id.
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See Quinby v. WestLB AG, 04 Civ. 7406, 2006 WL 2597900, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 5, 2006) (noting an argument that a party sample was inherently flawed where the
period of sampling was not representative of timeframes covered by the requested
document production).
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3. A “HYBRID” APPROACH: BLENDING SAMPLING WITH SEARCH
TECHNOLOGY TO MAXIMIZE EFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY
[76] The decision of whether to use keywords, concepts, or sampling in a
given litigation should not be approached from a “one size fits all”
perspective. “[T]here is nothing to prevent combining one or more . . .
techniques in hybrid fashion to optimize search results”177 during both
document preservation and review. As two observers put it:
With large text-based data compilations, word and concept
searches are well-accepted methods for locating and
retrieving responsive data. To narrow large collections of
backup media, sampling is likewise a well-accepted
methodology. Technology is rapidly developing in this
area, and promises to give parties better tools to reduce the
scope of searches, reducing costs and burdens all around.178
[77] Accordingly, courts and litigants are beginning to fashion discovery
search protocols for attorney review and production that incorporate both
sampling and search technology.179 For example, due to the enormous
costs often associated with data restoration and attorney review, a
company can restore a sample of ESI and then use keyword searching to
determine what measure of relevant data that sample contains.180 The
company can then extrapolate from that the potential responsiveness of the
ESI, as well as how much it would cost an attorney to review the culleddown dataset.181
[78] A combination of sampling and keyword/concept searching also
could be used to validate proposed keywords or concepts to be used in
culling down a large collection to a smaller set to be reviewed by
attorneys. For example, a producing party could apply a certain set of
177

Baron, supra note 111, at 5.
Carroll, supra note 102, at 8.
179
See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(using a keyword list to locate relevant documents in a sampling of backup tapes).
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See id.
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See id; see also Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594,
603 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
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keywords and/or concepts to cull down a sample of the collection and then
analyze the results. To the extent the results show that the use of those
keywords and concepts did not except a large volume of relevant
information from the attorney review process, that validates and supports
the use of those keywords and concepts to cull down the remainder of the
collection.
[79] Likewise, in the preservation context, companies that have certain
technological capabilities can make innovative use of keyword searches,
concept searches, and sampling as part of the “reasonable steps” taken to
ensure that potentially responsive ESI is located and preserved.182 Again,
the key to reasonableness and defensibility is not necessarily the type of
search technology used, but rather the development of a well thought-out,
comprehensive search protocol that is applied consistently by the lawyers
and companies involved.183
[80] The precise combination of methodologies used for a given litigation
will depend upon the nature of the case and the data systems of the
particular company or companies involved. As Sedona Principle 6
recognizes, it is the producing party who is “best situated to evaluate the
procedures, methodologies and technologies appropriate for preserving
and producing their own electronic data and documents.”184 Accordingly,
producing parties should strike a balance between a good-faith,
cooperative spirit on the one hand, and efforts to avoid allowing the
opposing party to dictate the precise methods by which it locates relevant
documents on the other.185
[81] Litigants should educate themselves and courts alike with respect to
the potential efficiencies to be gained by employing advanced search
strategies in all areas of discovery. Search technologies, while in their
infancy, are rapidly growing ever more robust. It is to be expected that the
courts will be playing “catch-up” for some time to come. Increasingly,
however, “judges, even those raised before the dawn of the modern
182
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computer era, are becoming comfortable with the technology and size of
electronic discovery.”186 Both parties and courts should continue to
encourage and promote the use of search and sampling technologies in a
variety of stages of the discovery process.187
D. STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSIBILITY OF USING SEARCH AND
SAMPLING METHODOLOGIES IN DISCOVERY
1. ACT EARLY, ACT COOPERATIVELY
[82] As early as possible, a producing party should consider engaging the
requesting party in discussions regarding specific search and sampling
methodologies to be used in the discovery of ESI. 188 In addition to the
fact that the FRCP Amendments encourage early discussions of this
nature,189 proactively suggesting search and sampling protocols places the
186

Steven C. Bennett & Thomas N. Niccum, Two Views from the Data Mountain, 36
CREIGHTON L. REV. 607, 619 (2003). See, e.g., Zakre v. Norddeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale, No. 03 Civ. 0257, 2004 WL 764895 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2004).
187
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, cmt. 11.a.
188
Commentators encourage collaborating about search selection criteria with opposing
counsel during early “meet and confer” conferences. See, e.g., Gregory P. Joseph &
Barry F. McNeil, Electronic Discovery Standards – Draft Amendments to Civil Discovery
Standards, A.B.A. SECT. LITG. 8 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/electronic/document.pdf (noting that during
early discovery conferences, “parties should consider stipulating to . . . the use of
specified key terms or other selection criteria to search some or all of the potentially
responsive data for discoverable information.”). Moreover, the FRCP Amendments
increase the odds that counsel will be able to settle on detailed search methodologies in
the early onset of litigation in light of the need for counsel to become familiar with their
clients’ computer systems and ESI for the 26(f) conference, and develop strategies
accordingly. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) comm. n (“When a case involves discovery of
[ESI], the issues to be addressed during the Rule 26(f) conference depend on the nature
and extent of the contemplated discovery and of the parties’ information systems. It may
be important for the parties to discuss those systems, and accordingly important for
counsel to become familiar with those systems before the conference”).
189
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3) (requiring the parties to “meet and confer” to discuss any
issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information); FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(f) comm. n (discussing a variety of issues regarding ESI that deserve attention
during the discovery planning stage, including identification “of the various sources of
[topics relating to discovery] within a party’s control that should be searched for ESI,”
and the discussion of “any issues regarding preservation . . . particularly . . . with regard
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producing party in a favorable position should future disputes arise
regarding ESI.190 Simply creating an opportunity for the requesting party
to have input on those matters enhances the producing party’s own
credibility in those disputes. The more the requesting party rebuffs
attempts at bilateral discussions, the less credibility it will have in making
future objections to the court about the search process ultimately
selected.191 Parties “who appear to stonewall or fail to make complete
responses to discovery requests do so at their peril. The courts can and do
penalize recalcitrant parties.”192
[83] As standards for using particular software products employing one or
more search methodologies becomes streamlined, opposing parties in
litigation will “theoretically be more likely to reach agreement . . .
concerning the use of those products for conducting wide-scale searches of
e-records.”193 Moreover, if the FRCP Amendments are any indication,
courts may expect the parties to agree upon streamlined electronic
discovery protocols during early meet-and-confer sessions. After all, one
of the driving principles behind the FRCP Amendments was the need to
expedite discovery and reduce the costs of litigation.194
to ESI. The volume and dynamic nature of ESI may complicate preservation obligations
. . . . The parties should pay particular attention to the balance between the competing
needs to preserve relevant evidence and to continue routine operations critical to ongoing
activities”).
190
See, e.g., Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(implementing a search protocol formulated by a producing party and noting that the
requesting party’s refusal to cooperate would have justified the producing party’s
unilateral search, review, and production of electronic data where requesting party
refused to stipulate to a search strategy for electronic documents).
191
See, e.g., Tulip Computers Int’l v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002 WL
818061, at *6-7 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002) (ordering extensive discovery in the fashion
suggested by the requesting party in light of the producing party’s earlier failures to
cooperate).
192
Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital Era: Considerations
for Corporate Counsel, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, 11 (2003); see, e.g.,
Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885 (Fl.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (entering default judgment against producing party for host of
discovery abuses, including repeated unjustified refusals to agree to discovery search
protocols).
193
Baron, supra note 111, at 244.
194
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) comm. n.

41

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 3

[84] The Rules contemplate that a party should be prepared, early in the
discovery process, to discuss proposed protocols for streamlining ESI
discovery, including search and sampling methodologies and the format
for production.195 As one court recently stated:
[A]s the [FRCP Amendments] make clear, counsel have a
duty to take the initiative in meeting and conferring to plan
for appropriate discovery of electronically stored
information at the commencement of any case in which
electronic records will be sought . . . . At a minimum, they
should discuss . . . the burdens and expenses that the
producing party will face . . . and how they may be reduced
(i.e. . . . using sampling to search, rather than searching all
records).196
[85] The same court noted that “[t]he days when the requesting party can
expect to ‘get it all’ and the producing party to produce whatever they feel
like producing are long gone.”197 Where a defendant has an immense
volume of electronic records and the plaintiff relatively few, “it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to have reasonable expectations as to what
should be produced by the defendant” in recognition of the fact that, in
such cases, ESI discovery “is not played on a level field.”198
[86] In view of advancing the efficiency directives of FRCP 1, parties
should take care to discuss, in detail, search and sampling protocols
relating to ESI in meet-and-confer conferences following the issuance of
document requests. To the extent that the parties cannot agree on those
protocols, responding parties should not unduly hesitate in asking courts to
endorse them in furtherance of the spirit and mandate of FRCP 1. Raising
and resolving these issues at the front-end of discovery not only reduces
the costs of managing relevant data, but it also may serve to diffuse
potential discovery disputes further down the road, thereby advancing the
195

Id. See, e.g., Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 245 (D.
Md. 2005).
196
Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 245.
197
Id.
198
Id.
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directive of FRCP 1 to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.”199
2. DO NOT WAIT UNTIL THE MOTION TO COMPEL: TAKE EARLY,
AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO SECURE THE COURT’S ENDORSEMENT OF SEARCH
AND SAMPLING STRATEGIES
[87] Any seasoned litigator knows that discovery negotiations do not take
place in Shangri-La. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where, despite
numerous meet-and-confer sessions, the parties cannot arrive at an agreedupon protocol for the use of search and sampling methodologies for the
discovery of ESI. While parties can always enter into court-endorsed
stipulations regarding electronic discovery protocols after the Rule 26(f)
and Rule 16(b) timeframe,200 parties often wait until they are in a motion
to compel context before they get the court involved. There is no reason
to so delay court participation, especially now in light of the recent FRCP
Amendments. Absent agreement from the opposing party, parties should
start acting affirmatively to secure court approval of reasonable discovery
protocols, including search strategies involving sampling, keyword, and/or
concept search methodologies. 201
[88] For example, a party can move for a protective order202 outlining
specific terms and conditions under which discovery of electronic
information may be had. New Rule 26(b)(2)(B) explicitly provides that a
party from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order
from discovery of ESI from sources that it identifies as “not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”203 Even where ESI is
“accessible,” but nonetheless costly to search, review, and produce, a party
may always move for a protective order under the proportionality rule,
now found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C).204 The proportionality rule recognizes
199

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See, e.g., Palgut v. City of Colo. Springs, No. CIVA 06CV01142 WDMMJ, 2006 WL
3483442, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 29, 2006) (discussing a stipulation and order regarding
electronic discovery plan and order to preserve evidence).
201
See Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
202
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
203
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
204
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c).
200
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that discovery should be limited where the court determines that burden or
expense of discovery outweighs its likely benefit.205 A motion for
protective order should detail the proposed search procedures, explain why
attempts to secure agreement from the opposing party failed, provide
specifics as to the costs and burdens associated with the proposal, and
otherwise explain good cause for the terms proposed.
[89] As discussed in section IV.C, infra, the proportionality rule set forth
in 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) also allows a court to deny altogether an aspect of
discovery where the burdens of the discovery outweigh its benefits.206
Obtaining the court’s outright denial of a form or scope of discovery
requested by the opposing party may in some cases be the most
appropriate way to achieve the “just, speedy, and “inexpensive” resolution
mandated by FRCP 1.
E. ATTAINING “DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT” 207 WITH AN EFFECTIVE DATA
LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT POLICY
[90] Perhaps the most effective measure a company can take to cut
discovery costs has nothing directly to do with discovery, but with the
general day-to-day management of its data lifecycle. As discussed above,
modern technologies have done much to facilitate business, but “these
same technologies have the capacity to create a nightmarish amount of
potentially discoverable material.” 208 In-house counsel can save a
company a lot of money (and headaches) by developing and implementing
a robust data lifecycle management policy/program that provides
guidelines and requirements for the creation, dissemination, storage,
archival, and disposal of the company’s ESI. “Such policies and
procedures, if followed, reduce the amount of stored electronic
information and streamline the production process in the event of
litigation.”209

205

Id.
See infra section IV.C.4.
207
Ashby Jones, What a Mess!, NAT’L L. J., Dec. 2, 2002, at C6.
208
Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 15.
209
Id. at 13.
206
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[91] The FRCP Amendments have generated some panic and confusion
among companies, and their in-house counsel, about what changes
companies are now required to make with respect to data lifecycle
management. Will companies now need to retain, in perpetuity, all emails and other ESI generated by their employees (as one news report
incorrectly implied the day the new Rules went into effect)?210 The
answer, assuredly, is “no.” Of course, and as discussed above, as soon as
a company reasonably anticipates litigation it must institute a “litigation
hold” against any aspect of its data lifecycle management program that
would result in the spoliation of potentially relevant ESI.211 The
Amendments do not change that obligation. But there is no Rule
(Amended or otherwise) that dictates how companies must manage data
outside of litigation.
[92] Though the Rules do not require a company to implement a data
lifecycle management program, it is fair to say that the Amendments
(particularly new Rule 37(f)) make it even more beneficial for a company
to do so. Today companies “sit atop volcanoes of bits and bytes.”212
Companies use and retain ESI in a variety of different forms, and in a
multiplicity of locations, including servers, backup tapes, desktops,
laptops, PDAs, home computers, and so forth, many of which are often
hard to reach.213 Data storage is relatively inexpensive, so it often “just
piles up,” turning “corporate headquarters into technology silos.” 214 Such
hodgepodge document management is increasingly less workable in light
of the modern liabilities associated with the discovery of electronic
information. When ESI is managed poorly, it can end up later costing a
company millions of dollars in excess discovery costs when litigation hits.

210

See, e.g., Careful: Employee E-Mails, IMs Must Be Tracked, Dec. 1, 2006,
http://listserv.educause.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind06&L=smallcol&D=1&P=38497 (last
visited March 19, 2007) ( warning falsely, that “U.S. companies will need to keep track of

all of the e-mails, instant messages and other electronic documents generated by their
employees thanks to [the amended FRCP that took effect December 1, 2006”]).
211
See supra notes 83 & 85 and accompanying text.
212
Jones, supra note 207.
213
Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84.
214
Jones, supra note 207.
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[93] First, the lack of an effective data lifecycle management program
makes the task of finding and preserving data potentially relevant to a
specific litigation like finding a needle in a haystack. Many of the high
costs associated with discovery arise in part because electronic data stored
for one purpose is suddenly required to be preserved, collected, and
processed for another purpose, and the company infrastructure is not able
to shift gears accordingly.215 Simply put, “the larger the number of
records stored, the slower and more rigorous the search for them will be.”
216
Thus, companies end up spending a great deal of money simply to
locate their own stored information, often without any guarantee of
reasonable success. 217 Moreover, even when companies do have data
lifecycle management policies, such as data retention schedules, a lack of
oversight and enforcement in making sure employees carry out those
policies can result in the “expenditure of considerable time and money in
discovery disputes over the production of e-mails that should have been
destroyed in the first place.” 218
[94] Second, plaintiffs’ lawyers are increasingly taking advantage of the
apparent mismanagement or non-management of ESI to cause litigation to
degenerate into a collateral proceeding about information that the
company allegedly has allowed to be spoliated and what kind of “adverse
inference” or other sanction is an appropriate punishment for that
215

Isom, supra note 36, at 11.
Marilee S. Chan, Paper Piles to Computer Files: A Federal Approach to Electronic
Records Retention and Management, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 809 (2004).
217
Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 3.
218
Id. For example, in Tulip Computers, defendant Dell belatedly identified the existence
of a massive amount of potentially responsive data nine months after being served with
discovery requests. Dell admitted that it had mistakenly destroyed documents as well.
Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp.. No. CIV.A. 00-981-RRM, 2002 WL
818061, at *4 (D. Del. April 30, 2002). In granting the plaintiff extensive additional
discovery that allowed it “to ascertain for themselves whether Dell’s representations that
all responsive documents have been produced are accurate,” noting Dell’s failure
“indicates either a failure to take its discovery obligations with the required degree of
seriousness and diligence or an extreme lack of knowledge and control over its own files
and procedures.” Id. at *6-7; see also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (stating that expensive
and time-consuming discovery dispute over e-mails “would be moot” if producing party
had followed its e-mail retention policy).
216
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spoliation.219 In the context of sanctions for the spoliation of relevant
documents, a company’s ignorance about the way computer systems retain
and dispose of ESI is not a defense. The seminal Zubulake decisions put
an end to any doubts about that.220 Irrespective of the state of a
company’s management of records, once it “reasonably anticipates
litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction
policy and place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant
documents.”221 This duty requires “a party and her counsel [to] make
certain that all sources of potentially relevant information are identified
and placed ‘on hold.’ To do this, counsel must become fully familiar with
her client’s document retention policies, as well as the client’s data
retention architecture.”222
[95] A key problem with this standard, for many companies, is that they
often have no coherent data retention policy to begin with—in essence,
they do not have their ESI “house” in order. In a 2006 survey published
by E-Discovery Advisor Magazine, 50% of corporate attorneys responded
that they are either not confident in their company’s document retention
program or their company doesn’t have any program/policy.223
Compounding the problem, many in-house lawyers “are very
uncomfortable with the technical side” of data management.224
[96] It is vital that corporate America begin to regain control of its
electronic data.225 The best measure companies can take to avoid being
trampled underfoot by both mounting discovery costs and the increasing
risk of sanctions for spoliation of relevant evidence is to develop and
implement an effective data lifecycle management program that addresses
the systemic storage and disposal of electronic data. While a detailed
discussion of the elements of data lifecycle management are beyond the
219

Mazza & Sternberg, supra note 84, at 19.
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
221
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (emphasis added).
222
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432.
223
Are Companies Prepared for the New Federal Rules on E-Discovery?, E-DISCOVERY
ADVISOR MAG., Web Ed. 2006, Week 48, http://e-discoveryadvisor.com/doc/18626.
224
Jones, supra note 207, at C7.
225
Id. at C6.
220
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scope of this article,226 the development and implementation of a
successful program will require participation from multiple departments
within a company, including legal, IT, and senior management. “All who
are involved in the creation, storage, and destruction of documents should
follow the policy, and the company should create an enforcement
mechanism.”227 It is therefore important for companies to take affirmative
steps to confirm that their policies are understood and followed by
employees at all levels. 228 IN the end, a program can keep ESI volume
and proliferation to a minimum so that there is less data sitting around, and
in fewer locations, when litigation hits, thus serving as the first line of
defense against the increasing costs associated with ESI discovery.
IV. COST-SHIFTING IN DISCOVERY: WINNING THE BATTLE THAT MAY WIN
THE WAR
[97] A long-standing federal presumption, articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, holds that that the party
responding to a discovery requests pays all related production expenses.229
Modern courts, however, have shown an increased willingness to issue
cost-shifting orders to reduce the burden of discovery for parties that
otherwise would be saddled with huge discovery costs given the scope of
the discovery requests and/or the inaccessibility of the potentially relevant
ESI. This trend recognizes that a party should not be able to strategically

226

See Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 13 (discussing and listing the considerations
corporate counsel should take into account when developing a document retention policy)
227
Dort & Spatz, supra note 192, at 13.
228
Jones, supra note 207, at C7 (“[I]t takes just one provocative e-mail to create a publicrelations disaster or a litigation liability.”). See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 439-40
(discussing the liabilities caused when employees disregard company directives in an
atmosphere where the directives are not properly monitored and enforced by the
company).
229
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (holding under
discovery rules that “the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense
of complying with discovery requests”); Toshiba Am. Electronic Components, Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532. 538 (2004) (“The general rule in both state and federal
court is that the responding party bears the expense typically involved in responding to
discovery requests, such as the expense of producing documents.”).

48

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 3

abuse the Oppenheimer presumption by issuing broad discovery requests
to drive up opponents’ litigation costs and force settlements.230
[98] Cost-shifting battles are hotly contested and for good reason:
decisions on motions regarding who will be required to pay for discovery
responses (the cost of which may run into the hundreds of thousands, if
not tens of millions, of dollars) can impact severely how an action
proceeds and in fact may be outcome-determinative in some cases.231 This
section examines the evolution of the law of cost-shifting both in federal
and state court and as relevant in the recent FRCP Amendments. It then
explores the arguments in favor of shifting other ESI discovery costs that
have not historically been the subject of cost-shifting discussions. Finally,
this section sets out several issues practitioners should consider when
making the move to shift all or some of their clients’ discovery costs.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF COST-SHIFTING
[99] “Early” cases addressing cost allocation of ESI discovery required the
responding party to bear the cost of producing ESI, reasoning that having
to produce the data in litigation was an ordinary and foreseeable risk of
using electronic storage media.232 Despite an increasing number of high230

Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2204 (1989).
231
See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
Courts must remember that cost-shifting may effectively end discovery,
especially when private parties are engaged in litigation with large
corporations. As large companies increasingly move to entirely paperfree environments, the frequent use of cost-shifting will have the effect
of crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases. This will
both undermine the ‘strong public policy favor[ing] resolving disputes
on their merits,’ and may ultimately deter the filing of potentially
meritorious claims.
Id. (quoting Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com, Inc., 249 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2001));
Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, No. 01 CVS 10614, 2006 WL 3287382, *5 (N.C. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (“It is indisputable that the decisions concerning the costs of ediscovery in some cases could be outcome-determinative.”).
232
See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 376682 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 15, 1995) (denying a motion that requesting party
bear the cost of producing electronic documents: “if a party chooses an electronic storage
method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable
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profile cases and the recent FRCP Amendments turning the tide, the law
on shifting the cost of producing ESI remains jurisdiction-specific, often
unsettled, sometimes conflicting, and continually evolving. While costshifting principles emerging in federal court can provide some guidance
for resolving ESI discovery disputes in state courts, state-specific statutes
and case law can vary greatly from federal standards. Counsel for a party
wishing to effectively pursue the shifting of costs associated with ESI
discovery, therefore, should gain an understanding of the emerging
standards and recent judicial decisions in the relevant jurisdictions.
1. FEDERAL LAW
[100] The majority of ink that has been devoted to discussing the trials and
tribulations of ESI discovery (not to mention the seminars, forums,
working groups, rules, guidelines, and opinions) focuses on federal courts
and the FRCP. Existing federal case law on the topic of cost-shifting deals
almost exclusively with the burden and expense of producing data stored
on back-up tapes. 233 Interestingly, the Rules do not expressly contemplate
risk”); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 464 (D. Utah 1985) (denying a motion
to shift costs of discovery of electronic data because: (1) the defendant was in the “most
economical position to call up its own computer stored data,” (2) cost was not excessive,
(3) relative burden in obtaining the data was substantially greater to requesting party, and
(4) responding party was benefited to some degree); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 972307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Mass. June 16, 1999) (stating that the cost of
restoring electronic data in response to discovery request is “one of the risks taken on by
companies which have made the decision to avail themselves of the computer
technology”).
233
See, e.g., Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04CIV.7406 (WHP) (HBP), 2006 WL 2597900,
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) (shifting 30% of costs of restoring and searching e-mails
of former employees from back-up tapes); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D.
568, 574-77 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (shifting part of the costs associated with restoring,
searching, and managing data on backup tapes to requesting party); Hagemeyer N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 603 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (ordering
defendant to restore a sample of backup tapes and parties to make additional submissions
addressing whether burden or expense of satisfying entire request is proportionate to
likely benefit); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003) (requiring defendant to bear part of costs of producing approximately 996
network backup tapes, containing, among other things, plaintiff's email); Zubulake I, 217
F.R.D. at 322 (articulating seven factor cost-shifting analysis for determining who should
pay the cost of producing material from “inaccessible” media, like backup tapes); Rowe
Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
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cost-shifting. Rather, in federal court, discovery cost-shifting has
historically been done pursuant to a district court’s discretion under Rule
26(c) “to grant orders protecting [respondents] from ‘undue burden or
expense,’” which has been interpreted to include orders for the requesting
party’s payment of the costs of discovery.234
[101] Rule 26(c) protective orders are especially important in the context
of ESI discovery, where the costs of production can cripple responding
parties and force them to settle cases prematurely. There is a growing
body of federal case law addressing cost-shifting when ESI is inaccessible,
such as data that resides on back-up tapes. Most notable are the watershed
Zubulake decisions, which are widely regarded as the most thorough
treatment of cost-shifting under federal law. In light of the Amendments
addressing cost-shifting considerations under the FRCP, however, the
validity of pre-Amendment case law is unclear. Given that Zubulake’s
Judge Scheindlin sat on the committee to amend the Rules, the cases and
its progeny still may be valuable tools for interpreting the meaning and
scope of the Amended Rules.
(A) ZUBULAKE’S APPROACH
[102] In the oft-cited decisions in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, which are
six in number, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York
created the cost-shifting test for discovery that has been widely used by
the federal courts.235

(recognizing the difficulties created when litigants must comply with discovery requests
seeking data contained on backup tapes); McPeek v. Ashcroft,, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34
(D.D.C. 2001) (“The more likely it is that the backup tape contains information that is
relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the [responding party] search at its own
expense”).
234
Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 358. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 34, advisory comm.
notes to 1970 Amendments (“[T]he Courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect
respondent against undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring
that the discovering party pay costs.”).
235
See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D.309; Zubulake II, 230 F.R.D. 290 (2003); Zubulake III, 216
F.R.D. 280 (2003); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (2003); Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422
(2004); Zubulake VI, 382 F. Supp. 2d 536 (2005). Because the new test required the
producing party to investigate certain issues and report back to the court, Judge
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[103] The plaintiff in Zubulake contended that “key evidence is located in
various e-mails exchanged among UBS employees that now exist only on
backup tapes and perhaps other archived media.”236 UBS argued that it
had produced all responsive documents, although admittedly it had never
searched for responsive emails on any of its backup tapes.237 The court
promptly rejected UBS’s argument, finding the facts “strongly” suggested
that the backup tapes contained responsive emails necessary to Zubulake’s
case.238 The court then turned to the issue of cost-shifting. UBS urged
that, due to the immense cost of restoring and searching the backup tapes,
it should not bear the undue burden or expense of producing e-mails from
them.FN In evaluating whether to diverge from the presumption that the
responding party pays for discovery costs, the court adopted the following
three-step approach.
(I) STEP ONE: DETERMINE ACCESSIBILITY OF DATA
[104] Zubulake instructed that the “first question . . . is whether costshifting must be considered” at all.239 The court rejected the proposition
that shifting should be considered in all ESI cases, citing both the
Oppenheimer presumption and the fact that today “virtually all cases”
involve ESI.240 Rather, the court held that “cost-shifting should only be
considered when electronic discovery imposes an ‘undue burden or
expense’ on the responding party.”241
“[W]hether production of
documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether
it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format (a distinction that
corresponds closely to the expense of production).”242

Scheindlin did not apply it fully to the facts of her case until Zubulake III. For cases
adopting Zubulake’s approach, see infra n.252.
236
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311-12.
237
Id. at 317.
238
Id.
FN
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 318.
242
Id.
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[105] The court then offered the following hierarchy of the accessibility of
ESI, from most accessible to least accessible:
•
•
•
•
•

Active, online data (data used in the very active states of its
life, such as when it is being created or received or
processed, e.g., hard drives);
Online data (data stored in a robotic storage device that
uses multiple read/write devices to store and retrieve
records, e.g. optical disks);
Offline storage/archives (data stored on removal optical
disks or magnetic tape media that can be labeled and stored
on a shelf or rack);
Backup tapes (data stored on tape drives that are not
organized for retrieval);
Erased, fragmented or damaged data (data never meant to
be retrieved that can only be accessed after significant
processing).243

[106] Of these categories, the court held the first three were considered
accessible and the last two were considered inaccessible.244 This portion
of the Zubulake test is particularly important because it is the gateway to
the cost-shifting analysis. If the requested discovery comes from the first
three categories, the Oppenheimer presumption controls. If the discovery
comes from the latter two categories, a cost-shifting analysis ensues.
(II) STEP TWO: TEST-RUN SAMPLE DATA
[107] The second step instructs that the producing party should test a
sample of the data to estimate the cost and likelihood that the requested
discovery will be responsive. The court held that the results of that test
would be used to determine whether to shift costs.245

243

Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 319-20.
245
Id. at 323-24.
244
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(III) STEP THREE: APPLY THE SEVEN-FACTOR TEST
[108] Armed with the information learned in the test-run, the third and
final step involves analyzing whether cost-shifting is appropriate.246
Emphasizing the requirements of Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) (now Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii)), the court offered its own seven-factor test, listed from
most to least important:
(1)

the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information;

(2)

the availability of such information from other sources;

(3)

the total cost of production, compared to the amount in
controversy;

(4)

the total cost of production, compared to the resources
available to each party;

(5)

the relative ability of each party to control costs and its
incentive to do so;

(6)

the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and

(7)

the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.247

[109] The court applied its seven-factor test to the sampling results and
found that factors 1-4 cut against cost-shifting, factors 5-6 were neutral,
and factor 7 favored cost shifting.248 Although these findings would
appear to weigh against cost-shifting, the court held that because
continued production may produce valuable information, “some cost
shifting is appropriate.”249 The court explained that “the precise allocation
is a matter of judgment and fairness rather than a mathematical

246

Id. at 324.
Id. at 321-23.
248
See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
249
Id.
247
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consequence of the seven factors . . . .”250 The court shifted 25% of the
cost to the plaintiff and assigned the other 75% to the defendant.251
[110] The primary point of the Zubulake decision is that a district court
judge has broad discretion in deciding cost-shifting disputes.
Nevertheless, the Zubulake approach has been applied in several federal
cases.252
(B) AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
[111] The Amended FRCP provide that parties are expected to produce
relevant documents and data from locations that are “reasonably
accessible,” and notify their opponents of locations that are “not
reasonably accessible” but where it is possible that relevant documents
may reside.253 “A party need not provide discovery of electronically
stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”254 The Committee Note to
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) suggests that the required identification “should, to the
extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to
evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the
likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.” It

250

Id.
Id.
252
See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 04-1245-MLB-DWB, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83363, at *19-35 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006); Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04 Civ.
7406, 2006 WL 2597900, at *7, *11-16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006); Xpedior Credit Trust
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp.2d 459, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Multitech. Servs., L.P. v. Verizon, No. Civ. A 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 1553480 (N.D.
Tex. July 12, 2004); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570-73 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (modifying Zubulake test by adding an eighth factor “that considers the
importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues of the litigation”;
Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602-03 (E.D. Wis.
2004); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 476 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
253
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). Even where a party asserts that potentially relevant
electronic documents or data reside in a location that is “not reasonably accessible,” that
party still may be obligated to preserve the data in that location throughout the life of the
litigation. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2)(B) (amended 2006) comm. note
254
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
251
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does not specify when (at what point in the discovery process) that
identification should take place.255
[112] If an agreement cannot be reached as to whether, or on what terms,
sources identified as “not reasonably accessible” should be searched and
discoverable information produced, a requesting party may move to
compel production or the responding party can move for a protective order
barring the discovery.256 The court may order production if the
responding party does not convince the court that the data is “not
reasonably accessible.” Even if the responding party does so convince the
court, the court still may order production where the requesting party
shows “good cause” for the production, “considering the limitations set
forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”257 What facts will satisfy a responding party’s
burden of proving inaccessibility is not spelled out in the Rule.258 The
Advisory Committee notes to Amended Rule 26(b)(2) provide that, once
the burden has shifted to the requesting party to show good cause, the
seven-factor test from Zubulake provides some of the “[a]ppropriate
considerations” that may be used to determine whether the burdens and
costs of requiring a responding party to search for and produce ESI that is
not reasonably accessible can be justified in the circumstances of the
case.259
[113] If the court orders production, the requesting party may be required
to pay some or all of the cost of accessing the data and converting it into a
format that allows the responding party to review and produce it.260 The
Rules also contemplate that parties discuss, and even experiment with,
sampling as a means to assess the best way to deal with data that is “not
reasonably accessible.”261 As of the time of the writing of this article,
there have been no notable federal decisions construing or interpreting
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) as Amended.

255

FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2)(B) (amended 2006) comm. n.
Id.
257
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
258
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2)(B) (amended 2006) comm. n.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
256
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2. STATE COURT
[114] State court judges are seeing disputes regarding the discovery of
electronic information with increasing frequency. When those discovery
issues arise in state court, however, they are often governed by state rules
and case law that are substantially different from those that guide federal
courts. In particular, as is discussed in this section, some states have
procedural rules governing the allocation of discovery costs that are quite
different from the federal rules.262 Moreover, while there are numerous
federal decisions addressing who should bear the burden of costs
associated with discovery of electronic information, there is comparatively
little precedent in state courts.
(A) CALIFORNIA
[115] In California, California Code of Civil Procedure section
2031.280(b) governs whether some or all of the potentially substantial
costs associated with producing ESI in a usable format should be shifted to
the requesting party. It provides that “any documents demanded shall
either be produced as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, or
be organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in the demand”
and that, “[i]f necessary, the responding party at the reasonable expense of
the demanding party shall, through detection devices, translate any data
compilations included in the demand into reasonably usable form.”263
This cost-shifting provision therefore puts the burden on the requesting
party to pay for electronic data translation and compilation as long as the
cost is reasonable.

262

But see Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 05-CVS-5564, 2006 WL
3093174, at *16 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (discussing North Carolina’s Guidelines
For State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery Of Electronically-Stored Information
regarding reallocation of discovery costs reflects three-tiered test and cost-benefit
analysis from Zubulake and discussing that “[l]ike Zubulake, the Guideline treats costshifting as a matter for the judge’s discretion”).
263
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2031.280(b). California courts may also order the use of
technology, such as CD-ROMs, Internet Web sites, electronic document depositories,
Internet depositions, videoconferencing, etc., to aid the discovery process in certain cases.
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 2017.730-740.
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[116] The question of whether the cost-shifting contemplated by section
2031.280(b) is mandatory was answered in the affirmative by the
California Court of Appeal in Toshiba America Electronic Components,
Inc. v. Superior Court. In a rare appellate writ proceeding on a discovery
issue, the California Court of Appeal considered the phrase “at the
reasonable expense of the demanding party” and whether this cost-shifting
was “mandatory” or “merely permits the trial court to shift the cost to the
demanding party when the responding party objects.”264 Defendant
Toshiba argued that the provision automatically shifted costs for extensive
data restoration, estimated between $1.5 and $1.9 million.265 Plaintiff
Lexar Media countered that Zubulake and Rule 26(c)’s “undue burden or
expense” standard controls.266 While recognizing that “the general rule in
both state and federal court is that the responding party bears the expense
typically involved in responding to discovery requests[,]”267 the court
relied on the controlling California statute to ultimately side with Toshiba,
holding that the demanding party is expected to pay the reasonable costs
of necessary electronic data translation pursuant to section 2031.280(b),
and noting that Zubulake does not control in California .268
[117] The Toshiba court is said to have “charted a new course in the costshifting debate” in California that “could significantly affect the way
litigators in the state approach cost-shifting arguments.”269 The case,
however, left several key questions unanswered. For example, what are
“reasonable” expenses and “necessary” translations under section
2031.280(b)? Does the rule for back-up tapes apply to other forms of ESI,
given that section 2031.280(b) refers broadly to “data compilations”? The
court did advise that the bounds of “reasonable” and “necessary” should
264

Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Lexar Media, 124 Cal. App. 4th 762, 767
(App. Ct. 2004).
265
Id.. at 766.
266
Id. at 770.
267
Id. at 769.
268
Id. at 771-72. The Toshiba court noted that while California Code of Civil Procedure
section 2031 does not contain a specific procedure for challenging the burden that costshifting may place on the demanding party, insofar as a demanding party thinks the costs
are unreasonable, that party must avail itself of generally applicable relief procedures,
such as a protective order. Id. at 773.
269
Linda G. Sharp, Restoration Drama: The Complexity of Electronic Discovery
Requires Practitioners to Master New Litigation Skills, 28 L.A. LAW. 31 (2005).
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be determined by sampling and may result in only partial cost-shifting or
none at all; indeed, the demanding party may seek a protective order if it
disputes either point.270 While any attempts to extend Toshiba’s holding
to other platforms, such as deleted data on hard drives, are certain to meet
with stiff resistance, California cases generally recognize that burdensome
discovery requests may require cost-shifting to satisfy “principles of
fundamental fairness,” since the requesting party is asking the producing
party to do something special that falls beyond the call of routine
discovery.271
(B) NEW YORK
[118] In stark contrast to the Oppenheimer presumption and the Zubulake
approach for determining when to depart from that presumption, New
York courts have held that under the state’s Civil Practice Law and Rules
(CPLR), “the party seeking discovery should incur the costs incurred in
the production of discovery material.”272 As such, whether it is
appropriate to shift the costs of discovery of electronic information is not
an issue in New York state court because the presumption at the outset is
that the requesting party pays for discovery. “Therefore, the analysis of
whether electronic discovery should be permitted in New York is much
simpler than it is in the federal courts. The court need only determine
whether the material is discoverable and whether the party seeking the

270

Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Lexar Media, 124 Cal. App. 4th 762, 773
(App. Ct. 2004).
271
See id. at 769 (“In some circumstances . . . principles of fundamental fairness require
the demanding party to pay any significant ‘special attendant costs beyond those typically
involved in responding to routine discovery.’”) (quoting San Diego Unified Port Dist. v.
Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
272
Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). See also Waltzer v. Tradescape & Co., L.L.C., 31 A.D.3d 302, 304
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“[A]s a general rule, . . . the party seeking discovery should bear
the cost incurred in the production of discovery material.”); Rosado v. Mercedes-Benz of
N. Am., Inc., 103 A.D.2d 395, 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“each party should shoulder
the initial burden of financing his own suit, and based upon such a principle, it is the
party seeking discovery of documents who should pay the cost of their translation”).
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discovery is willing to bear the cost of production of the electronic
material.”273
[119] For example, in Lipco Electrical Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., the
plaintiff sought e-discovery that the defendant claimed would be
“extremely difficult, time consuming and expensive” to extract from its
computer hard drives or back-up tapes.274 Unable to find state court
precedent dealing with discovery of electronic information, the court cited
Zubulake for the proposition that electronic documents are discoverable.275
But the court then bypassed the federal analysis for deciding who should
bear the cost of the discovery, finding that cost-shifting was not an issue
because “under New York law, the party seeking discovery must bear the
cost of production of the items for which discovery is sought.”276
Therefore, the court refused to order the production of the ESI at issue
until such time as the requesting party expressed a willingness to pay for
the associated costs, subject to later apportionment on proper
application.277
[120] The Lipco court did not seem entirely comfortable with this
outcome, noting that discovery of electronic information “raises a series of
issues that were never envisioned by the drafters of the CPLR.”278 The
court further noted that “[t]he cost of providing computer records can be
rather substantial”279 and differs substantially from traditional paper
discovery.280 The court’s analysis suggests that it might have reached a
different conclusion but for the New York presumption in favor of
discovery cost-shifting. Unless and until changes are made to the CPLR
or New York’s highest court addresses this issue,281 however, litigants in
273

Lipco, 2004 WL 1949062, at *9 (noting this was “especially true” where the
requesting party “has been provided with hard copies of the electronically stored data”).
274
Id. at *6.
275
See id. at *7-8.
276
Id. at *9.
277
See id. at *10.
278
Id. at *6.
279
Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01, 2004 WL 1949062, at *8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
280
See id.
281
The New York Administrative Board of the Courts has established statewide uniform
rules, effective January 17, 2006, governing the jurisdiction and procedures of courts in
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New York state court can expect that costs associated with obtaining
discovery of electronic information will be borne by the party requesting
the materials, and obtaining those materials may be conditioned on the
requesting party affirmatively agreeing to pay such costs.282
(C) TEXAS AND MISSISSIPPI
[121] Texas and Mississippi have identical rules governing discovery of
electronic information that mandate cost-shifting in certain
circumstances.283 Those rules require that where the requesting party
specifically asks for ESI, and specifies the form in which it should be
produced, the responding party must produce what responsive ESI is
reasonably available to it in the ordinary course of business.284 If the
responding party cannot, through reasonable efforts, retrieve the data or
the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court, which handles complicated commercial
cases. See Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, Dec.
29, 2005, http://www.nycourts.gov/comdiv/CD-Rules.pdf. Among other things, the new
rules address the topic of discovery of electronic information. Specifically, under Rule 8
of the new section 202.70 of the Uniform Rules for N.Y.S. Trial Courts, attorneys are
required to meet and confer about discovery issues including data preservation plans,
relevant data identification, data production, cost allocation, identification of individuals
responsible for data preservation, confidentiality and privilege issues, and designation of
experts. See also Uniform Rules for N.Y.S. Trial Courts, pt. 202,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/rules/trialcourts/202.shtml#70.
282
A New York court may, under certain circumstances, require the producing party
initially bear certain costs associated with discovery production. See, e.g., Weiller v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 604285/04, 2004 WL 3245345, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16,
2005) (ordering party to initially bear costs associated with compliance with preservation
order covering “all databases, electronic material, tape media, electronic media, hard
drives, computer disks and documents” as related to certain categories of documents).
While the Weiller court was “not insensitive to the cost entailed in electronic discovery”
and suggested it would, “at the appropriate juncture, entertain an application by
defendants to obligate plaintiff, the requesting party, to absorb all or part of the cost of
the e-discovery it seeks,” it refused to “constrain the production of possibly relevant
evidence on account of the later need to allocate the cost.” Id.
283
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4; MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). In Texas, the general rule is that
“the expense of producing items will be borne by the responding party and the expense of
inspecting, sampling, testing, photographing, and copying items produced will be borne
by the requesting party” absent a court order “for good cause.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.6
(emphasis added).
284
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4; MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
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information requested, or produce it in the form requested, it can file a
motion. If the motion is granted, the court must order the requesting party
to pay for the reasonable expenses of any extraordinary steps required to
retrieve and produce the information.285
[122] As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there is no “set in stone”
standard or process for determining which ESI discovery expenses a court
may be willing to shift to the requesting party and under what
circumstances that shifting may occur. Accordingly, a practitioner
contemplating a cost-shifting motion should be familiar not only with the
standard from the relevant jurisdiction, but also other persuasive authority
that may have broken new or analogous ground.
B. MOVING BEYOND BACK-UP TAPES: SHIFTING OTHER DISCOVERY
COSTS
[123] While it is undisputed that the costs of restoring, translating, and
electronically searching inaccessible data on back-up tapes are potentially
eligible for shifting, those costs may represent a small portion of a client’s
discovery budget.286 The million dollar question (literally) is when can the
cost of attorney document review (which can skyrocket in discovery of
ESI), and other expenses that identifying and producing ESI entail, be
recovered from the requesting party?

285

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4; MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). See also Bank of Am. Corp. v.
SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 05-CV5-5564, 2006 WL 3093174 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 1, 2006)
(“Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 . . . requires that whenever a court orders a
responding party to produce information that is not ‘reasonably available,’ the court must
require the requesting party to pay the ‘reasonable expenses of any extraordinary steps
required to retrieve and produce the information.’”).
286
See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he estimated cost of
restoring and searching the remaining backup tapes is $165,954.67, while the estimated
cost of producing them (restoration and searching costs plus attorney and paralegal costs)
is $ 273,649.39 ($19,003.43 for the five sample tapes, or $3,800.69 per tape, times
seventy-two unrestored tapes), a difference of $ 107,694.72.”).
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1. THE COST OF REVIEWING DOCUMENTS FOR RELEVANCE, PRIVILEGE,
AND/OR OTHER PROTECTIONS
[124] The cost of reviewing and analyzing ESI for production can be a
substantial item on a party’s discovery bill. Privilege review is a difficult
task in the paper world, and it quickly can become unmanageable when
ESI is involved. One of the reasons ESI can hinder the discovery process
and prove such a heavy draw on resources is that documents cannot just be
handed over to the requesting party. Rather, documents must first be
reviewed by attorneys for relevance and responsiveness and, even more
importantly, to exclude, redact, and/or mark with appropriate
confidentiality designations those documents that contain material that is
subject to the attorney-client privilege and/or other protections (such as
privacy and trade secrets). “The volume of such data, and the informality
that attends the use of e-mail and some other types of electronically stored
information, may make privilege determinations more difficult, and
privilege review correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming.”287
The task is further complicated by the existence of potentially privileged
embedded data (e.g., earlier edits to a document) and metadata (e.g.,
identifying information automatically generated by word processing
programs).288
[125] Despite the high costs of reviewing ESI for privilege, courts thus far
have been reluctant to shift the cost of that burden to the requesting party,
sometimes explaining that the producing party is uniquely positioned to
control the scope of those costs.289 Contrary to that rationale, however, is

287

FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(f) (amended 2006) comm. n.
Id.
289
See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 290 (“[T]he responding party should always bear the
cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has been converted to an
accessible form” because (1) “the producing party has the exclusive ability to control the
cost of reviewing the documents” and (2) “the producing party unilaterally decides on the
review protocol.”); Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. 02 C 4721,
2003 WL 21277129, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2003) (ruling that costs of a third party
computer consultant to make copies of eight imaged hard drives and search for privileged
communications should not be shifted to the requesting party); Byers v. Ill. State Police,
No. 99 C 8195, 2002 WL 1264004, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2003) (“[P]laintiffs’ motion
is granted to the extent that they bear the cost of licensing the old e-mail program, though
288
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the legal requirement that parties conduct a thorough review for privilege
and similar protections or risk waiving the privilege/protection—not only
for the actual documents produced, but possibly as to entire subject
matters.290 Some courts have even held that a privilege review consisting
solely of an electronic search for certain keywords is insufficient to
preserve the privilege. Due to this conundrum, advocates should not
unduly hesitate to argue that under Rules 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) the court
should shift the costs of attorney review, or even deny particular discovery
of certain electronic information altogether, in cases where the value of
that discovery is outweighed by the burden of conducting an attorney
review before production.291 Logistically, courts could require the
producing party to estimate the cost of reviewing ESI for privilege and
work product just as they do for search and restoration, and could require a
similar sampling procedure to provide a factual basis for the estimate.
2. OTHER ESI DISCOVERY COSTS TO CONSIDER SHIFTING
[126] The expansion of the scope of ESI discovery gives rise to and
escalates a number of other expenses that should be considered for
inclusion in cost-shifting requests, even though the courts have not yet
addressed whether those costs shifting. Where the requesting party issues
the typical, broad request for ESI and refuses to agree to accept anything
the defendants shall continue to bear the expense of any review for responsive
documents, as well as for privileged or confidential material.”).
290
See, e.g., Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. 99-3298, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18763, at *6 (D.D. Cir. May 17, 2004) (stating that inadvertent disclosure waives
the attorney-client privilege; “the scope of the waiver extends to all communications
relating to the same subject matter, and will not be exempted, distinguished or balanced
by ‘degrees of voluntariness,’ except in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” (citing In re
Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
291
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. note (“[T]he producing
party’s burdens in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege may weigh
against permitting the requested discovery.”); see, e.g., In re General Instrument Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. 96-C1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999) (nonmonetary costs are properly considered in assessing burden imposed by discovery; “the
technical matter of retrieving the documents from the backup tapes would be just the start
of the process”). See also Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic
Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 131 (2004) stating that (privilege review and
production are as much costs of discovery as restoration and can be unduly burdensome
or expensive because the volume of ESI is so much greater).
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less than a burdensome, large-scale ESI preservation, collection,
processing, review, and production effort, the responding party should
consider whether to ask the court to shift the costs of those efforts to the
extent the requested discovery is not denied outright.292 Potential costs to
be shifted include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Identifying all possible locations of discoverable data across a vast
array of storage devices.
Familiarizing counsel with IT systems to prepare for eventual
collection and production.
Preserving accessible data and halting a backup tape recycling
program under a litigation hold.
Productivity losses suffered when forensic operations make
computer systems unusable.
Disruption of normal business operations where billable in-house
IT and other staff must attend to tasks related to ESI discovery.
The cost of purchasing special processing and review tools to
allow for the forensically sound migration and production of ESI.
Processing large amounts of ESI to cull out data that does not meet
basic relevance standards (e.g., date, file type, keywords,
duplicates).
Engaging experts, consultants, and specialists for tasks beyond
restoration and translation (which are already considered shiftable),
such as forensic collection of ESI, sampling, affidavits, and
testimony.
Producing ESI in the requested format.

[127] For example, the complexity of a client’s network infrastructures
and IT policies can make pinpointing the specific location of relevant ESI
difficult and time consuming:
In today’s increasingly digital workplaces, a small or
medium-sized office may have five to 30 network servers
that may be backed up to a single backup tape or backed up
independently by server or function. Furthermore, larger
292

See infra section IV.C.2.(d)
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corporations typically operate by using hundreds or
thousands of servers that may be segregated by function or
task, business unit, or geography. Each of these servers
may be backed up by a system of multiple backup tapes.293
Therefore, as discussed supra in Section III, one of the biggest challenges
at the outset of a case is developing a thorough understanding of a client’s
network infrastructure and IT systems. Counsel must determine the
client’s capabilities to search for and retrieve electronic data, and
understand what data may be accessible and what data is arguably
inaccessible.
[128] Once located, the expense associated with preserving large amounts
of accessible data can be enormous. Zubulake suggests that a potential
litigant could preserve accessible electronic evidence by simply taking “a
mirror-image of the computer system” as soon as the duty “to preserve
documents in the state they existed at that time” attaches.294 “Taking a
mirror-image of an entire, active computer system, however, in practice,
likely will prove to be a more formidable task, particularly for large
companies, companies with multiple or overseas offices, or companies
that have employees that use various electronic data systems (laptops,
home PC’s, PDA’s, etc.).”295 While Zubulake states that parties need only
halt recycling of tapes that store documents of key players which are not
otherwise available,296 the cost of acquiring new tapes for that category of
data backup can mount quickly, as can the cost of locating the backup
tapes that have the data of relevant custodians or for the relevant time
frame.
[129] It also may be possible to recoup the cost of expert, consultant, and
dedicated in-house staff time. For example, in Portis v. City of Chicago,
the plaintiffs’ law firm had compiled an electronic database of arrest
293

Sharp, supra note 269, at 34.
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
295
Stephen D. Whetstone & Kara A. Millonzi, E-Discovery Document Preservation &
Cost-Shifting: A Matter of Dollars and Sense 2005, at 6, available at
http://www.stratify.com/stratify_resources/articles/Whetstone_DocPreserv_and_CostShif
ting.pdf (last visited March. 19, 2007).
296
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218.
294
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records from paper and electronic data produced by the City, a timeconsuming and expensive project.297 After declining to participate in the
compilation, the City decided it wanted to use the database, and it moved
to compel production of the database. The court granted the motion, but
ordered the City to split the plaintiffs’ compilation costs, including the
paralegals’ and computer consultant’s time spent on the project.298
[130] Finally, there is the cost of formatting ESI for production. Several
cases that considered the production format for ESI before Amended Rule
34(b) gave the format choice to the demanding party. While a document
request may still specify the form in which ESI is to be produced under
Amended Rule 34(b), a responding party is also involved in determining
the form of production because written responses must state the form the
party intends to use for producing ESI if the requesting party does not
specify a form or if the responding party objects to a form that the
requesting party specified.FN If the parties cannot agree on a production
format and seek assistance in resolving the dispute, the court is not limited
to the forms initially chosen by the requesting party, stated by the
responding party, or specified in the rule.FN Where the desired or ordered
production format is burdensome to the producing party, shifting costs is
one way to accommodate the burden.299
C. MAKING THE ARGUMENT TO SHIFT COSTS IN THE DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
[131] The following discussion outlines some steps practitioners may find
useful in developing and tailoring their cost-shifting arguments. While
Zubulake is widely regarded as the most thorough consideration of cost297

Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 WL 2512084, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7,
2004).
298
Id. at *2-4. The plaintiffs calculated the cost based on the paralegals’ and computer
consultant’s hourly billing rate, rather than the “out of pocket” rate actually paid by firm,
i.e., the portion of their salaries actually paid by the firm for this work. The court held
the billing rate was proper because it represented the plaintiffs’ opportunity cost and put
the parties in position they would be in had they collaborated on the project from the
beginning. Id. at *4-6.
FN
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 34(b).
FN
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 34(b) (amended 2006) comm. n.
299
See infra at section IV(C)(2).
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shifting to date, it is by no means settled law. Case law remains sparse,
and attorneys may need to refer to other jurisdictions by analogy. Because
the cost-shifting analysis is so fact-specific, courts develop and refine
applicable standards with each new case on their dockets. The contours of
successful cost-shifting arguments also vary by jurisdiction. This dynamic
situation offers litigators a unique opportunity to advocate for cost
allocations that are fair to their clients and helps further sound policy,
while in the process shaping the evolution of discovery law.
1. GATHER INFORMATION EARLY: WHERE IS THE ESI, WHAT NEEDS TO BE
DONE TO IT, AND WHAT WILL THAT COST?
[132] When faced with a burdensome discovery request with ESI
discovery issues, one of the first tasks for counsel is to acquire an
understanding of how much ESI exists and how much it will cost to
produce. Regardless of the standard used, “the most important ingredient
for the analytical process to produce a fair result is a particularization of
the facts to support any challenge to discovery of electronic records.”300
Gathering the facts to support a cost-shifting argument requires
investigating the full range of sources of ESI, any restoration and
translation requirements, and which experts and specialists may be needed
to complete the job and testify in court.
[133] The broad sweep of ESI that is potentially discoverable301 may
require a litigant to conduct a forensically sound collection of data in
many formats from a multitude of storage devices. To gauge the potential
cost of collection, counsel as well as appropriate business and IT
personnel should survey the potentially relevant universe of data types and
storage devices that parties may seek to discover, which could include:

300

Thompson v. U. S. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) (stating that parties may inspect or
otherwise access “writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings,
images, and other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which
information can be obtained ”). The Civil Rules Advisory Committee that drafted the ediscovery amendments noted that the amendment to Rule 34 was intended “to cover all
current types of computer-based information” and “encompass future changes and
developments.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) comm. n, cmt., n.

301
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Documents (including drafts), e-mails, instant messages, text
messages, digitized voicemail, electronic calendars, web content
(including intranets, extranets, blogs, web-based meetings,
webcasts and podcasts), embedded and meta-data, fragmented and
deleted data, software and source code.
Desktop computers, laptop computers, network and e-mail servers,
removable media (including compact discs, flash memory sticks,
PDAs, iPods), cell phones, and archival and back-up media.

[134] The category of costs most likely to be shifted to the requesting
party is that of searching and translating inaccessible electronic data into a
usable form. The effort and expense involved in transforming ESI in
various formats and locations into information searchable and readable by
humans, can multiply quickly when that data is stored with no plan for
retrieval in the future, let alone the targeted retrieval and review that
litigation requires. Therefore, producing ESI is expensive, not only
because of the additional time it requires, but also because of the
specialized knowledge, services, and equipment of technical experts for
everything from basic collection to testifying about the process in court.
[135] Additional ESI processing costs should be appraised, such as culling
data down to a relevant time frame and relevant custodians, de-duping,
key word searching, review by attorneys for relevance and privilege, and
formatting ESI prior to production or for use as evidence at trial. Various
document management and review tools may be required as each of these
stages, which could involve licensing and other expenditures.
[136] Outside vendor, consultants, and expert expenses lie beyond the pale
of ordinary business and litigation expenditures, so they make good
candidates for cost-shifting. Counsel should assess categories of expert
costs, including data collection, restoration and translation (including
computer forensics), and expert testimony in court pertaining to discovery
of electronic information issues. Additionally, keeping expert costs under
control (e.g., insisting on a detailed budget, getting bids, monitoring costs)
will enhance cost-shifting arguments to the court (and benefit attorneyclient relationships where such arguments fail).
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[137] ESI may be inaccessible or so broadly diffused across platforms and
devices that it is difficult to locate. Therefore, the need for experts in the
discovery of electronic information may arise as early as the data
collection stage, and specialists may be required to identify, collect, and
analyze run-of-the-mill records that another party requests. This is
traditionally the work of lawyers or in-house personnel, and the addition
of consultants and/or experts fundamentally changes the cost structure of
litigation. Additionally, most litigants will need to retain outside vendors
to perform the restoration and translation of inaccessible data. These tasks
may include computer forensics work,302 such as making mirror-images of
hard drives and reconstructing lost, deleted, or damaged data.303
Restoration and translation predicates have no analog in traditional
discovery, making them indisputable additions to the cost of discovery
since the paper age. Furthermore, these are time-consuming, highly
technical exercises that require many hours of work by expensive
personnel.
[138] A litigant may also need to engage an expert witness to testify to the
efficacy of its discovery technology, the projected cost of responding to a
discovery request, the technical implications of various data retention
programs, etc. Due to its technical nature, courts are increasingly calling
for experts to testify in court regarding discovery requirements. An
accusation of failure to preserve relevant ESI may lead the court to require
302

Forensic examinations of hard drives and servers by outside experts raise additional,
potentially costly issues: the risks of disclosing privileged material and of violating
privacy laws. See GEORGE L. PAUL & BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION:
E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 142-44
(American Bar Association 2006). Because a forensics expert can access any data stored
on the computer she investigates, counsel may need to devise ways to screen for privilege
and privacy on the entire machine, regardless of potential responsiveness to the discovery
request. This requirement imposes additional cost up front, as well as potential liability
or loss of litigation leverage down the road as a result of waived privilege or disclosure of
protected private data.
303
Courts may be more receptive to cost-shifting arguments where the other side requests
discovery that can only be obtained by forensic work. For instance, in the employment
case Laurin v. Pokoik, the plaintiff sought to discover the date certain ledger entries had
been made in the defendant’s computer, which could only be ascertained through
forensics. In ruling on the request, the magistrate stated that the proper procedure would
be for the plaintiff to move to compel at her own expense. Laurin v. Pokoik, No. 02Civ.
1938, 2004 WL 2724767, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004).
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investigation by a neutral third-party expert. Again, these expenses
exceed the traditional bounds of discovery. Attorneys should incorporate
fees for testifying and investigatory experts into their discovery cost
estimates early in the case, and advocate for cost-shifting wherever the
benefit-burden analysis and fairness considerations require it.
[139] Finally, because discovery of electronic information raises a number
of cost questions absent from traditional discovery, litigants hoping to
resolve them in their favor should assess and address the above
considerations as early in the case as possible. In this vein, the amended
FRCP call for early discussion of discovery costs in several places, which
can help lay the foundation for future cost-shifting arguments. Ultimately,
a party that knows where its EIS is, what needs to be done to it, and how
much that will cost, will be in the best position to urge a courts to shift the
cost of some or all of its discovery costs.
2. LITIGATING THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF ESI DISCOVERY
[140] Under Rules 26(b)(2)(B) 26(b)(2)(C), and 26(c), the responding
party may move for a protective order or the requesting party may move to
compel when there is a dispute over the discovery of ESI. The FRCP and
case law require courts resolving those disputes to balance the benefits of
the ESI discovery at issue with the burden, including expense, on the
producing party. The burden-benefit analysis is always a case-specific
inquiry and a court’s willingness to shift costs will vary with the issues at
stake. For instance, drafts of contracts in a case may hold more benefit
where intent is an issue than in a straight breach of contract case.304
[141] While discovery of electronic information can burden the producing
party on a number of fronts, urging the court that all ESI discovery in a
case is burdensome is not credible, as it is undisputed that computer
technology can make the production of responsive information easier in
some respects.305 Also, any benefit the discovery brings to the producing
304

See also Cognex Corp. v. Electro Sci. Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 01CV10287RCL,
2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (finding little benefit in recovering
deleted e-mails in patent case as compared to an employment discrimination case).
305
See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[E]lectronic evidence is
frequently cheaper and easier to produce than paper evidence because it can be searched
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party is weighed against cost-shifting under all relevant tests: Zubulake,
Rule 26(c), etc. Therefore, counsel for the responding party should assess
any possible benefit to the requesting party in producing ESI and be
prepared to modulate cost-shifting arguments accordingly in anticipation
that the requesting party will point to those benefits to defuse requests to
shoulder an ESI discovery bill.
[142] Shifting costs may be an appropriate balancing mechanism in a
variety of circumstances, some of which are discussed below. In addition,
effective cost-shifting arguments will highlight the legal and factual
considerations that limit the likely benefits of the requested discovery.
They also will distinguish unfavorable cases where the legal theories
and/or factual circumstances at issue made the benefit to the requesting
party greater, or the burden to the producing party lesser, than in the case
at hand.
(A) THE “NOT REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE” THRESHOLD IS A MOVING
TARGET
[143] Multiple information systems and constant technological change
make the parameters of accessibility elusive.306 Zubulake attempted to
break the world of ESI down into five categories (active, online data; nearline data; offline storage/archives; backup tapes; and erased, fragmented or
damaged data) and then performed a cost-shifting analysis only as to the
last two categories of “inaccessible” data307 Electronic data storage is
more complicated and dynamic that this, however, a party need not
automatically, key words can be run for privilege checks, and the production can be made
in electronic form, obviating the need for mass photocopying.”); Itzenson v. Hartford
Life and Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 99-4475, 2000 WL 1507422, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct
10, 2000) (rejecting defendant’s claim that searching thousands of electronic files for a
particular subject would be unduly burdensome). See generally Shira A. Scheindlin &
Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the
Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 364 (2000) (“By comparison [to the time it would take to
search through 100,000 pages of paper], the average office computer could search all of
the documents for specific words or combinations of words in minute, perhaps less.”).
306
PAUL & NEARON, supra note 302, at 14 (“when the rules speak about whether
something is ‘reasonable’ to do, the adjudication will depend more on the enveloping
system than it will on the information itself”).
307
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-319.
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abandon a cost-shifting argument simply because the discovery at issue
does not fall into one of the two categories blessed by Zubulake.
[144] Courts generally agree that restoring archival or deleted data
presents sufficient burden such as to warrant the consideration of costshifting.308 Litigants can generally term such ESI as “not reasonably
accessible” without much controversy. Other categories are not so clear.
The “not reasonably accessible” standard was meant to be a moving target.
“It is not possible to define in a rule the different types of technological
features that may affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically
stored information.”309 This flexibility can be used to try to convince the
court that a cost-shifting argument succeeds on the particularized facts of a
case.
(I) ACTIVE DATA MAY BE INACCESSIBLE FOR DISCOVERY PURPOSES.
[145] Even active ESI may pose undue burden and expense when being
produced for litigation. The degree of burden and expense may depend on
where the data resides. For example:
•

•

Proprietary systems, used by many businesses from
technology companies to accounting firms, may not have
readily available searching and translation/production tools
and requesting parties often cannot comprehend
information produced from them in native format.FN
Relational databases, which exist in fluid form, must be
manipulated to produce relevant, responsive information
and can present potentially large confidentiality and
privilege problems.310

308

E.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002)
(“[I]t is a well accepted proposition that deleted computer files, whether they be e-mails
or otherwise, are discoverable”; ordering mirror imaging of defendant’s hard drive where
plaintiff had agreed to pay cost.); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(shifting some cost of restoring archival data).
309
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. n.
FN
Amended Rule 34(a) does require that, if necessary, a responding party “translate”
information it produces into a “reasonably usable” form. The Committee Note to Rule
34(b) further states that “[u]nder some circumstances, the responding party may need to
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Computer systems that are significantly more complicated
than typical systems found a most businesses—for example
where the company recently has undergone numerous
mergers or acquisitions and thus data on certain areas of the
system are extremely difficult to access—may be held to be
inaccessible due to the system’s extraordinary
“complexity.”311

[146] Each of these actively used data sources from which data would be
difficult or expensive to extract could present strong arguments for costshifting under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) based on burden or expense.
(II) BUSINESSES SHOULD BE FREE TO CHANGE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
WITHOUT BEING PENALIZED IN LATER LITIGATION.
[147] The FRCP Amendments recognize that technology will continue to
evolve, and leave the benefit-burden standard flexible to accommodate
that change.312 Nonetheless, pre-amendment case law suggests that courts
may decline to deem ESI “not reasonably accessible” where the
inaccessibility results from the client’s choice to decommission a system.
For example, in Xpedior Credit Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA),
provide some reasonable amount of technical support, information on application
software, or other reasonable assistance to enable the requesting party to use the
information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (amended 2006) comm. n.
310
E.g., Multitech. Services, L.P. v. Verizon S.W., No. CIV A 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL
1553480 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (holding that while a report requested from
defendant’s client databases was accessible, the plaintiff has to pay half the cost of
creating it. Finding Zubulake inapposite, the court nonetheless ran through the factors
and concluded that splitting the expense provided the defendant with incentive to control
costs while also recognizing that only the plaintiff would benefit from the report’s
creation and production).
311
PAUL AND NEARON, supra note 301, at 130 (2006) (“[W]hat the committee is
addressing [in Rule 26(b)(2)(B)] is . . . the difficulty of access because of the complexity
of a system.”) (emphasis omitted).
FN
See id. at 84-87 (summarizing numerous “negative” comments submitted in response
to a discussion draft of amended Rule 34 regarding production in “native format,”
including a lengthy comment submitted by Microsoft).
312
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. N., cmt. n. (“It is not possible to
define in a rule the different types of technological features that may affect the burdens
and costs of accessing electronically stored information.”).
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Inc., Judge Scheindlin (of Zubulake fame) applied her cost-shifting factors
to archival optical discs that had been made inaccessible when the
defendant merged with another company and decommissioned the Unix
servers that accessed the discs.313 With four factors weighing against costshifting and the rest neutral, the court denied costs even though the
defendant no longer had the hardware and software needed to access
data.314
[148] There are strong arguments that Xpedior is has been superseded by
Amended Rule 26(b)(2), which states that a responding party does not
have to produce ESI from sources that are “not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost” While potential litigants may have some
duty to maintain reasonable access to ESI expected to be relevant to
litigation within a reasonable future time period, the force behind the
Amendments and current court decisions is to find fair ways to allocate
discovery costs in a rapidly changing technology environment. Inevitably
and by their nature, electronic storage platforms and media will come and
go, a fact that should be considered by courts in judging accessibility.
(III) ALTERNATIVE SOURCES CAN PRECLUDE THE NEED TO PRODUCE
INACCESSIBLE ESI.
[149] Responding parties can challenge requests to produce inaccessible
ESI and avoid the resulting cost-shifting spats if the information is
available elsewhere in other formats. “In many circumstances the
requesting party should obtain and evaluate the information from
[reasonably accessible] sources before insisting that the responding party
search and produce information contained on sources that are not
reasonably accessible.”315

313

Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459,
465 (S. D.N.Y. 2003).
314
Id. at 467.
315
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006) comm. n., cmt. n.
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[150] In seeking to show that information requested from inaccessible
sources is available elsewhere, counsel should consider questions such as:
•
•
•
•

Is there evidence that relevant data has been not been
deleted, and thus is available from accessible sources?
Is there a company policy requiring hard copy print-outs of
the inaccessible data?316
Can the client identify paper duplicates of the inaccessible
electronic files?
Is the information available from an outside source, such as
the client’s auditors?

•
If information is available elsewhere at less expense, the requesting party
should have to pay the cost of acquiring it for more.317
(IV) CAUTION: REGULATORY RETENTION REQUIREMENTS MAY SERVE AS
ACCESSIBILITY BENCHMARKS.
[151] Clients subject to document retention requirements by regulatory
agencies such as the IRS or SEC may find that courts presume the
accessibility of any ESI falling within those requirements.318 This issue is
best addressed with clients before litigation. A robust data lifecycle
management policy319 will not only comply with those regulations but also
ensure the most-efficient and easiest access possible to electronic data that
is required to be retained. Most companies face some sort of retention
mandate, and are best advised not to have the only source of such ESI be a
pile of unmarked backup tapes, as a court is unlikely to entertain a costshifting argument in this instance. On the other hand, regulatory
requirements may create alternative sources, such as auditors or
examiners, of ESI that the party has otherwise destroyed. A court may
316

See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. Williams Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (attempting to show alternative sources failed where no company policy
required hard copies). Nothing in Amended Rule 34(b), prevents the court from ordering
that paper is a “reasonably usable” form where the only other source for the information
is “not reasonably accessible.”
317
Id. at 430.
318
See PAUL & NEARON, supra note 301, at 139-41.
319
See supra section III.E.
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require a party to go to those sources for electronic data no longer
internally accessible to a responding party before it will consider whether
data must be restored under Rule 26(b)(2) and at whose cost.
(B) SAMPLING ITSELF CAN PRESENT AN UNDUE BURDEN
[152] The Committee Note to Amended Rule 26(b)(2)(B) contemplates
sampling in certain circumstances and courts will likely see a trend of
increasing requests to order use of that methodology for cost-shifting
analysis or otherwise. While a potentially powerful cost-cutting tool,
sampling also can raise its own issues of burden and cost depending on the
circumstances. When a responding party asserts that electronic data is not
reasonably accessible, “[t]he requesting party may need discovery to test
this assertion,” which “might take the form of requiring the responding
party to conduct a sampling of information contained” on the inaccessible
sources.320 Nearly all courts considering accessibility and whether to shift
costs have required sampling of the data in question,321 and amended Rule
34 explicitly permits the inspection, testing, and sampling of ESI.322 The
purpose of sampling is two-fold: to estimate the cost of producing the full
request, and to develop the factual record sufficiently to narrow that
request.
[153] Sampling alone may be unduly burdensome for the responding
party: “where the cost of a sample restoration is significant compared to
the value of the suit, or where the suit itself is patently frivolous, even this
minor effort may be inappropriate.”323 Parties may raise the burden or
intrusiveness of sampling under Amended Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c).324
Conversely, sampling can serve the responding party’s interests where it
provides an opportunity to educate the court on the breathtaking expense
and limited value of what the other party has asked for. Hard data

320

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), (amended 2006) advisory comm. note, cmt. n.
E.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432.
322
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) comm. n., cmt. n. Rule 34 was changed “to
make clear that parties may request an opportunity to test or sample materials sought
under the rule.” Id.
323
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 n.77.
324
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (amended 2006) comm. n., cmt. n.
321
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showing the court that the requesting party seeks an “awfully expensive
needle to justify searching a haystack” could do just that.325
[154] There are of course other ways to develop the factual record
sufficiently to allow a court to rule on cost-shifting questions. The parties
are limited only “by the court’s own imagination and the quality and
quantity of factual information provided by the parties to be used by the
court in evaluating the Rule 26(b)(2) factors.”326 Armed with the detailed
understanding provided by the fact-gathering process and through
discovery or meet-and-confer conferences, counsel can encourage the
court to rule on the facts before it without the expense and delay of
sampling. Advocates also can forestall sampling with issue-narrowing
motions.327
(C) THE AMOUNT OF DISCOVERY EXPENSE THAT WILL TRIGGER COSTSHIFTING IS FACT-SPECIFIC
[155] The case-specific nature of the benefit-burden analysis suggests that
almost any ESI discovery expense may make a good candidate for costshifting under Rule 26(b)(2), depending on the circumstances of the case.
As a result, the amount of out-of-pocket discovery expense that will
convince a court to shift costs may vary widely. The Supreme Court has
generally directed courts to look at “whether the cost is substantial[,] not
whether it is ‘modest’ in relation to ability to pay.”328 For example, in the
discovery of electronic information context, a New York district court
shifted the mere $1,680 it would cost one of the defendants to create a
special program to extract documents from inaccessible sources.329

325

See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 99 (D. Md. 2003).
327
E.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3rd 1353, 1365 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding the court has power to stay discovery where it may be mooted by pending,
potentially dispositive motions on issues to which discovery is directed).
328
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1978) (holding that a
$16,000 expense to compile class member list was “substantial” and should be shifted to
plaintiff, who sought the information).
329
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1996 WL 22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 23, 1996).
326

78

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 3

[156] When the court evaluates burden by comparing the cost of
production to the amount in controversy, that will make costs less likely to
shift in a high-stakes case (e.g., patent litigation) than in a smaller-stakes
case (e.g., a contract dispute) unless the costs at issue are high. For
example, the court in Zubulake concluded that a factor of “several fold”
between the cost of production and the stakes ($273,650 to produce versus
a potential multi-million dollar recovery) weighed against cost-shifting,
noting that in a multi-million dollar case, “the cost of restoration is surely
not ‘significantly disproportionate’ to the projected value” of the case.330
Litigants in high-stakes cases where the amount of alleged damages is
speculative, will be subject to significant dispute, and will depend on
expert testimony should argue against the use of “amount in controversy”
as the basis for evaluating whether burden is undue.
(D) COST-SHIFTING IS APPROPRIATE WHERE DISCOVERY REQUESTS ARE
TOO BROAD
[157] As ESI has raised the specter of endlessly broad discovery, courts
have used cost-shifting to help parties think twice about the information
they seek. “Where a party multiplies the litigation costs by seeking
expansive rather than targeted discovery, that party should bear the
expense.”331 This standard can be particularly useful for parties that
receive egregiously broad discovery requests that are typical in certain
types of complex litigation. By the same token, the more specific a
discovery request is, the more reasonable it remains for the responding
party to pay its own expenses.332 In this vein, the end game of a costshifting argument may be not a reimbursement check, but a narrower
discovery request.
[158] Courts likely will be friendly to arguments that couch cost-shifting
in the context of encouraging thoughtful, targeted discovery. Further,
330

Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Rowe Entm’t, Inc., v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
332
See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 284 (requesting that all e-mails from five UBS
employees during two-year period was sufficiently specific to weigh against full costshifting, so court shifting only 25% of cost to requesting party); see also Zubulake I, 217
F.R.D. 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Specificity is surely the touchstone of any good
discovery request.”).
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clients may prefer to pay to respond to a narrowly tailored request than
have the hollow victory of reimbursement for an exhaustive production
that disrupts normal business. The threat of cost-shifting as a pressure to
narrow discovery requests also has good consequences at both the
practical and policy levels. Practically speaking, narrower discovery
promotes judicial efficiency and reduces costs to both parties. From a
policy perspective, requiring a requesting party to pay for broad discovery
helps to prevent fishing expeditions and the use of discovery as a sword to
induce settlement.
[159] When collecting ESI, there are various options to narrow the scope
of discovery requests, some of which are generally applicable to the
discovery context and some of which are specific to discovery of
electronic information. They include:
•
•
•
•

Urging the requesting party to reword or drop vague qualifiers,
such as those calling for “all documents relating to” a particular
subject matter;
Limiting the custodians, dates, sources, and locations of electronic
data to be searched;
Using keyword searches and other culling tools; and
Providing an initial “sample” of documents as the starting point for
negotiations.333

[160] Advocates who are fluent in the methods and technologies available
to narrow discovery requests and reduce the expense of production will be
more effective in resolving cost issues both for meet-and-confer efforts
and for the court. Counsel and their clients should also agree on how
narrowly the requests should be drawn to warrant a compromise on costs.
(E) PRODUCTION FORMATS MAY RAISE ADDITIONAL BURDEN ISSUES
[161] The format for production is an important feature of the production
of ESI. Requesting parties now may specify the desired production format
in discovery requests to “facilitate the orderly, efficient, and cost-effective
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See supra, section III.
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discovery of electronically stored information.”334 Though the requesting
party may now specify a preferred format, the responding party should
argue against producing formats that incur unreasonable costs. If a dispute
over format is brought to the court for resolution, the responding party
should consider arguing that to the extent the court orders production in a
burdensome format the requesting party should shoulder some or all of the
extra burden involved in producing in that format.
[162] Before meeting and conferring on discovery, counsel should become
familiar with the technical and cost implications to the particular client of
producing in the various electronic formats that the other side may request.
The categories of electronic formats, from least to most potentially
problematic to produce, include:
•
•
•
•
•

Images (most commonly .tiff or .pdf files; may be
electronic or paper printouts);
Native format (requires appropriate software on requester’s
part), with or without metadata;
Copies of backup or archival media (with software to
access, or in readable form);
Mirror images of hard drives; and
Direct access to computer systems.

[163] Where the requesting party does not specify a form, Rule 34(b)
allows the responding party to produce ESI in reasonably useful form or in
the form in which it is “ordinarily maintained.”335 The Advisory
Committee note to Rule 34(b) clarifies that the Rule requires the
responding party to “translate” data that is not “reasonably usable.”336
Under some circumstances, the responding party “may need to provide
some reasonable amount of technical support, information on application
software, or other reasonable assistance to enable the requesting party to
use the information.”337 Responding parties should consider arguing
334

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (amended 2006) comm. n.
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against these burdensome forms of production under the benefit-burden
test of Rule 26 and asking for cost-shifting in the event a burdensome
form of production is required.338
[164] Native format production has been endorsed by a number of
courts.339 Producing in native forma, however, requires additional
technical efforts—such as locking data so the requesting party cannot alter
it and a more complex method of electronic Bates stamping—and
additional privilege and relevance review of metadata, deleted data, and
fragmented data, which may in turn require further technical measures to
effect electronic redaction. There are also well-documented problems
with the use of native format files as evidence in litigation. Responding
parties should resist a format that would require production in more than
one form as contrary to Rule 34(b)(iii), but it is difficult to conceive of
how “native” files can be used in depositions, to support motions, or at
trial without further processing and duplicative production.
3. BALANCED VERSUS LOPSIDED CASES
[165] Since cost-shifting involves a case-specific analysis, advocates must
tailor arguments on the issue to suit the case at hand. In particular,
litigants may face different discovery dynamics depending on whether a
case is “balanced” (parties with roughly equal resources and discovery
338

Id. (“The questions whether a producing party should be required to convert [not
reasonably usable data] to a more usable form, or should be required to produce it at all,
should be addressed under Rule 26(b)(2)(B)”). For examples of recent district court
decisions approving lower-cost production formats, see Zakre v. Norddeutsche
Landesbank, No. 03 Civ. 0257, 2004 WL 764895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2004)
(approving production of 204,000 emails in text-readable format without any further
relevance cut where this was “in as close a form as possible as they are kept in the usual
course of business”); In re Lorazepan and Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d
43, 47 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that no index was required if CD-ROMs were searchable;
“[t]he glory of electronic information is not merely that it saves space but that it permits
the computer to search for words or ‘strings’ of text in seconds”).
339
E.g., Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Technologies, LLC , No. 04 C 3109, 2006 WL 665005 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 8, 2006); Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005);
In re Verisign, Inc. Securities Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2004); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:98CV2876, 2004 WL 3192729
(N.D. Ohio July 16, 2004).
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needs), or “lopsided” (parties with significantly different resources and
discovery needs). These differing dynamics may require different
discovery strategies and cost-shifting arguments.
[166] Courts will consider the parties’ resources under any of the costshifting tests. In a balanced case, the relative equality in resources weighs
for cost-shifting in either direction.340 Therefore, any expansive discovery
request made by a party in a relatively balanced case will (1) be made by
the other side in return, (2) put the party at risk for defending against a
cost-shifting request, and (3) make the court less sympathetic to the
party’s own cost-shifting arguments for the other side’s requests.
Resources of course weigh against cost-shifting when the requesting party
is significantly smaller than the party requesting to have costs shifted.
This is no reason, though, not to argue for cost-shifting, cost-sharing, or
denial of discovery. In Zubulake, for instance, the court found that the fact
that the plaintiff was an individual and UBS a large corporation weighed
against cost-shifting. The court nonetheless went on to consider the
plaintiff’s personal wealth and her lawyers’ ability to advance costs, and
assigned 25% of the costs of electronic data recovery to her.341
[167] Where the requesting party appears to be disadvantaged by size,
advocates for the responding party should remind the court that size
disparity alone does not justify burdensome discovery and that the fairest
solution may be to deny the request or require that it be narrowed
significantly. Where discovery is allowed, the respective parties’
resources should not be the controlling factor in the cost-shifting
determination. It costs almost nothing for a requesting party to put
together and issue an extremely broad, highly burdensome request for
production of documents. Even a “small” requesting party can gain a
significant strategic advantage by sending out a boilerplate request, which
then effectively puts the onus on the responding party to either spend time
and money preserving, collecting, processing, reviewing, and producing
enormous volumes of ESI early on in the case or spend time and money
340

See, e.g., OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (D. Cal. 2003) (taking into
account parties’ similar in situation in patent litigation when splitting the cost of source
code extraction).
341
Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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litigating discovery disputes. This “Hobson’s Choice” allows the
requesting party to abuse the discovery process by putting this pressure on
the responding party, even where it is “big,” to settle the matter rather than
litigate on the merits.
[168] This dynamic is exacerbated by the fact that in “lopsided” cases a
“small” requesting party typically has little or no ESI to be produced in the
litigation. That means that the requesting party has no incentive to be
reasonable in fashioning and negotiating the scope of requests for
production of ESI—it will have no need for the responding party to be
reasonable in kind as to its own requests.
[169] In many types of litigation, the cost of ESI production in “lopsided”
cases has caused the playing field to be imbalanced throughout the
discovery process, in favor of the “small” requesting party with no ESI of
its own to produce. Only when courts take all of the relevant factors into
consideration in “lopsided” cases can the shifting of certain costs of ESI
production to the requesting party truly begin to balance that playing field.
It may be necessary for courts to begin taking a very different approach to
the shifting and sharing of ESI discovery costs to bring modern-day,
complex litigation back into alignment with the mandate of FRCP 1.
4. REQUESTING THAT PARTICULAR DISCOVERY BE DENIED
[170] It is important to remember that cost-shifting arguments are only a
back-up to asking the court to deny burdensome discovery requests
outright. In some cases, outright denial may be more appropriate
protection from burdensome discovery requests than a cost-shifting order.
Attorneys should not become so enamored with the idea of shifting
discovery costs that they neglect to consider protesting the underlying
request in the first instance. Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and 26(c) provide that a
court may modify or deny a discovery request if the requesting party has
had ample opportunity to obtain discovery, if the material sought is
available elsewhere, or if the request is unduly burdensome. Two cases
show district courts deciding to deny discovery instead of shifting costs,
based on those policy grounds.
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[171] In In re General Instrument Corporate Securities Litigation, the
court denied discovery of e-mails from back-up tapes even though
production would not be unduly expensive, because the projected benefit
failed to outweigh the burden and ample opportunity for discovery had
been availed.342 The defendant had already produced 110,000 pages from
one year of back-up tapes when the plaintiffs moved to compel further
production, despite having stated at an earlier status conference that
discovery had concluded. As to the benefit, the court found that the large
number of documents already produced made it unlikely that additional
documents were necessary, and that the plaintiffs had failed to identify
“any specific factual issue” that would make it so.343 As to the burden, the
court found that it would be significant given the volume of the e-mail at
issue and the necessity of reviewing it for privilege and responsiveness.344
With expert discovery beginning, the court concluded that “[f]orcing
defense counsel to engage in document review would necessarily distract
their energies from the other parts of this ongoing litigation.”345
[172] In Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., the court
denied plaintiffs’ motion to compel restoration and production of data
from 820 back-up tapes covering a period of nine years, even where
plaintiffs offered to pay the full cost and even though such a broad search
would inevitably unearth relevant documents.346 For one, the defendant
had “already conducted an extensive search for relevant documents” and
produced thirty boxes of documents from every employee who had
worked on the product in dispute.347 “At some point, the adversary system
needs to say ‘enough is enough’ and recognize that the cost of seeking
every relevant piece of discovery is not reasonable.”348 The court also
found there would be limited benefit derived from the discovery,
distinguishing the patent infringement case before it from employment
342

In re General Instrument Sec. Litig. , No. 96 C 1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *5-6
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Id. at *6.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
Cognex Corp. v. Electro Sci. Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 01CV10287RCL, 2002 WL
32309413, at *5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002).
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Id. at *1.
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discrimination cases where relevant e-mails might be deleted by guilty
individuals but remain on backup tapes.349 Finally, noting that willingness
to pay does not waive limits on the number of interrogatories and
depositions a party can take, the court concluded that “[t]here is something
inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one party to obtain a
heightened level of discovery because it is willing to pay for it,” and that
“[t]he sense of fairness underpinning our system of justice will not be
enhanced by the courts participating in giving strategic advantage to those
with deeper pockets.”350
[173] The outright denial of superfluous or unduly burdensome discovery
requests serves FRCP 1’s policy goals of speedy cost-efficient resolution.
It also prevents the potential unfairness of allowing parties to “buy”
disproportionate discovery, which would represent a serious mishandling
of the cost-shifting principles inherent in Rule 26 and applied in federal
case law.351
V. CONCLUSION
[174] Advances in litigation technologies provide a great deal of promise
for litigants. Those technologies are still in their relative infancies, and we
are only beginning to scratch the surface of their potential to limit the
costs of discovery.
As concept and other forms of searching
methodologies mature and become more cost-effective, it is likely that
they will become more streamlined and accepted by courts. In light of the
growing complexity of the world of ESI, innovation and aggressive
advocacy for use of those technologies is needed to improve the efficiency
of the discovery process, and not just at the review and production stages.
The increasing need to make early decisions about the scope of relevant
documents during preservation efforts warrants the use of efficient
technologies at that stage as well.
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[175] While the courts are slowly moving away from the presumption that
the producing party pays for the cost of production, litigants need to
become better versed at articulating in plain English the unique burdens
involved in locating and producing ESI. Cost-shifting rules remain
jurisdiction specific, with some forums more receptive to cost-shifting
arguments than others. However, the arsenal of arguments to be
considered is wide-ranging and should provide some measure of relief for
clients facing enormous discovery bills.
[176] Finally, litigants should be aggressive in invoking FRCP 1 as a basis
for the innovative use of search strategies and cost-shifting to increase
efficiency and reduce costs across the board in discovery. It is only in this
way that the mandate of a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action will become a reality in discovery.

87

